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Preface by the  
German Institute for Human Rights
Rights violations experienced by migrant domestic 
workers in diplomats’ households may seem, at first 
glance, to be a side issue only of the broader discourse 
on human trafficking and exploitation of labor 
migrants. Upon further inspection, however, its rele-
vance as a human rights issue becomes clear in two 
respects: First, even if the number of victims consti-
tutes only a small portion of labor exploitation and 
forced labor worldwide, labor rights violations and 
exploitation in diplomats’ households are a global phe-
nomenon rooted in structural shortcomings in the pro-
tection of diplomats’ domestic workers, both in send-
ing states and in host states. Second, the employers’ 
diplomatic immunity aggravates rights violations and 
restrictions of freedom experienced by domestic work-
ers as it severely limits, if not entirely bars, victims’ 
access to justice. 
Spectrum of cases
Reported cases range from less severe labor law 
infringements (e.g. no remuneration for overtime work, 
less wages than agreed beforehand) over severe forms 
of labor exploitation (wages far below the minimum 
wage, overlong workings hours, no days off or holidays) 
to working and living conditions that amount to forced 
labor and slavery-like practices (low or literally no pay-
ment of wages, having to work around the clock, 
restrictions of liberty, inhuman accommodation and 
food, physical and sexual violence). While the over-
whelming majority of victims are women, mostly 
employed as domestic helpers, nannies or cooks, there 
are also cases of male victims, employed as cooks, gar-
deners or chauffeurs.
Rights violations
Victims may experience violations of their human 
rights in manifold ways: Their right to just and favora-
ble working conditions enshrined in Art. 7 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) is violated when they receive less than 
minimum wages, are forced to work overlong periods 
without adequate rest and without periodic holidays 
with pay. The prohibition of slavery, servitude and 
forced labor, enshrined in Art. 8 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Art. 
4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
is at stake in the most severe cases. The right to health 
may be violated by unhealthy working conditions with-
out rest periods and insufficient nutrition, as well as 
the right to an adequate standard of living, including 
adequate food (Art. 11, 12 ICESCR). The right to phys-
ical integrity and the prohibition of torture are vio-
lated by physical and sexual attacks and degrading 
treatment (Art. 7 ICCPR, Art. 3 ECHR). The right to pri-
vacy is affected when the domestic worker is not pro-
vided with a room for herself or himself (Art. 17 ICCPR, 
Art. 8 ECHR). Freedom of movement is infringed upon 
when the worker is not allowed to leave the house on 
her or his own (Art. 9, 12 ICCPR). The restriction of lib-
erty entails violations of other rights, such as the free-
dom of religion when the worker cannot go to a place 
of worship, or the right to family life, when he or she 
is not allowed to go out to visit or make a phone call 
to family members (Art. 18, Art. 17 ICCPR). Interna-
tional human rights treaties furthermore impose the 
duty on states to guarantee access to justice for such 
rights violations to victims (Art. 2 Para 3 ICCPR, Art. 
13 ECHR).
The relation between human rights and diplomatic 
immunity
When victims are seeking justice, their employers’ dip-
lomatic immunity, acknowledged in the 1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, comes into play, 
barring as well criminal, civil and administrative juris-
diction as the enforcement of judgments in the host 
state. Insofar, employers’ diplomatic immunity in prac-
tice overrules the human rights of the victim and leads 
to a situation of de facto-unaccountability and –impu-
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nity for exploitative employers. For the most severe 
cases amounting to slavery, general international law 
offers a resolution of this situation: The prohibition of 
slavery is generally acknowledged to have the status 
of a peremptory norm (“ius cogens”) in international 
law. Thus, it cannot be overridden by any state through 
international treaties or general customary rules not 
endowed with the same normative force. In situations 
when the exploitation of domestic workers amounts 
to slavery, the victims’ human rights thus precedes over 
diplomatic immunity. But even in those cases of human 
rights violations listed above which do not amount to 
slavery or torture, host states of diplomatic missions 
cannot confine themselves to referring to diplomatic 
immunity and remain inactive. Human rights impose 
on states the obligation to offer alternative ways to 
justice and redress for victims – be it by making avail-
able alternative complaint mechanisms or by providing 
compensation to the victims as a case of State liabil-
ity (as the French Conseil d’État determined in a recent 
judgment).
The study and the expert roundtable 
The German Institute for Human Rights carried out the 
present study to provide an expanded and comprehen-
sive insight into the practice of several European states, 
to identify examples of promising practice and to 
develop a comprehensive set of human rights based 
recommendations to all actors, especially the Protocol 
departments of Foreign Ministries and non-govern-
mental organizations. The study was conducted as part 
of the three-year project “Forced Labor Today: Empow-
ering Trafficked Persons”, carried out in cooperation 
with the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility, 
Future”.
On 2nd and 3rd of May 2011, the German Institute for 
Human Rights, in cooperation with the Special Repre-
sentative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking 
in Human Beings of the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), organized a roundtable 
on the issue of “Rights Violations and Access to Justice 
of Domestic Workers in the Context of Diplomatic 
Immunity” in Berlin. The roundtable was attended by 
thirty selected experts from nine countries and brought 
together representatives from Foreign Ministries, non-
governmental organizations, lawyers, the academia 
and International Organizations. The research findings 
and the recommendations were presented to partici-
pants and discussed in depth. All participants wel-
comed the study as the most comprehensive research 
of its kind and committed themselves to continue and 
reinforce their work to protect victims’ human rights. 
We hope that the study provides other actors both the 
incentive and the ideas for taking up this human rights 
issue, too.
Berlin, June 2011
German Institute for Human Rights
Prof. Dr. Beate Rudolf
Director
Dr. Petra Follmar-Otto
Head of Department Human Rights Policy Germany/
Europe
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Preface by the  
Foundation “Remembrance,  
Responsibility and Future” (EVZ)
The Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and 
Future” (EVZ) was the first attempt to pay compensa-
tion to victims of National Socialist slavery and, 
through that gesture, to recognize that they had suf-
fered a grave injustice. Since the payment’s ending in 
2007, the Foundation EVZ funds projects to promote 
international understanding and human rights in 
remembrance of the victims of National Socialist 
regime’s injustice.
Human rights are aimed at empowering individuals to 
assert their own rights. Human trafficking is not only 
a serious crime but also a human rights violation. Vic-
tims of human trafficking and other extreme forms of 
labor exploitation today have a right to assert claims 
for remuneration and compensation for violations, but 
very few victims are currently able to assert these 
claims. The formulation of victims’ rights in Germany 
primarily focuses on their status as witnesses in crim-
inal proceedings against perpetrators. And in cases in 
which victims successfully assert their rights, the 
received compensation and wage often falls short of 
what they are entitled to. 
The Foundation EVZ and the German Institute for 
Human Rights therefore cooperate in a three-year pro-
ject “Forced Labor Today – Empowering Trafficked Per-
sons”. The project is aimed at increasing the ability of 
persons who have been trafficked into extreme forms 
of labor exploitation in Germany to assert claims for 
wages and compensation against perpetrators and 
exercise their rights under the German Crime Victims’ 
Compensation Act. The project supports victims to 
bring their case before the authorities or courts to 
assert claims for remuneration and/or compensation. 
Victims may apply for legal aid to cover extrajudicial 
and legal costs. To support victims by successfully 
asserting court claims the project offers financial sup-
port for test cases by means of a legal aid fund.
The project is also aimed at governmental and non-
governmental organizations that come into contact 
with trafficked persons. This year the project presents 
the study “Rights Violations and Access to Justice of 
Domestic Workers in the Context of Diplomatic Immu-
nity”. The study addresses the employment of domestic 
workers in private households of diplomats with a focus 
on their access to justice following rights violations 
committed by diplomat employers. Persons concerned 
are faced with complete withholding of wages, are 
forced to work excessive hours without days off and 
without any or with inadequate compensation, accom-
modation or food or with restrictions of the workers’ 
freedom of movement by prohibiting them to have 
social contacts and to leave the house unaccompanied 
or by withholding their passports and special ID cards. 
Some of them even suffered physical, psychological 
and/or sexual violence, although such slavery-like con-
ditions were regarded as an exception.
The persons concerned are faced with the diplomatic 
immunity of their employees as an additional difficul-
ty in accessing justice. In this conflict of Human Rights 
vs. diplomatic immunity the Foundation stresses that 
Human Rights and Human Dignity are a higher com-
modity than diplomatic immunity, even in diplomatic 
households there cannot be illegal areas.
By providing an overview of recent developments in 
Europe and identifying examples of promising practice, 
the study aims to offer a basis for discussion and to 
support the efforts of governments and NGOs to 
improve the access to justice for the concerned per-
sons. The study focuses on practices in Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands in their capac-
ity as host states for foreign diplomatic missions and 
international organizations. The Author interviewed 
Foreign Ministry Protocol departments, NGOs and law-
yers.
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Although the common project “Forced Labor Today – 
Empowering Trafficked Persons” combats extreme 
forms of labor exploitation in Germany we hope this 
approach will have an international impact.
The results of this study have been presented and dis-
cussed by experts from foreign ministries, non-govern-
mental organizations as well as international and Euro-
pean institutions at the International Roundtable in 
May 2011 in Berlin. The discussion underlined the 
results of the study, that e.g. Protocol departments in 
some countries have personal meetings with domestic 
workers or invite NGOs to come to the Ministry to meet 
the domestic worker in an atmosphere of trust to ena-
ble them to report rights violations and to find strate-
gies for support. The event carried out by the EVZ-
funded project “Forced Labor Today – Empowering Traf-
ficked Persons” was hosted by the German Institute for 
Human Rights in cooperation with the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
We also very highly appreciate that the rights of 
migrant domestic workers have been put on the agen-
da of the International Labour Organization (ILO). This 
study also comprises references the UN Committee on 
Migrant Workers first General Comment on “Migrant 
Domestic Workers”, published in 2011, which analyzes 
human rights violations experienced by migrant 
domestic workers as well as protection gaps of both a 
legal and practical nature.
Berlin, June 2011
Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future”
Dr. Martin Salm
Chairman of the Board of Directors
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1 
Rights Violations of Domestic Workers 
in the Context of Diplomatic Immunity 
- an Issue on the International Agenda
The German Institute for Human Rights (Deutsches 
Institut für Menschenrechte, DIMR) has commissioned 
the present study as part of the three-year project 
“Forced Labour Today – Empowering Trafficked Per-
sons”1 implemented by DIMR in cooperation with the 
Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” 
(Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft”, 
EVZ).
The issue of rights violations experienced by domestic 
workers employed by diplomats and the gaps and chal-
lenges these workers face in accessing justice as a 
result from diplomatic immunity, has increasingly 
emerged on the international agenda over the past 
decade.
Regional and international documents shed light on 
the rights violations experienced by domestic workers 
working for diplomats from different perspectives - 
labor rights, migrants’ rights, women’s rights, the rights 
of victims of crime/trafficked persons -, thereby illus-
trating the complexity of the phenomenon. They also 
demonstrate how a number of factors add up to a risk 
of dependency and abuse faced by private domestic 
workers employed by diplomats: First, the hidden and 
informal nature of domestic work relegates the work-
ing conditions of employees to the so-called “private 
sphere”, exempting it from state control and exacer-
bating the unequal power relationship between 
employees and employers. Even where domestic work 
is regulated by law, protection standards are often 
weaker compared to general labor laws. Furthermore, 
the privileged status of diplomats to whom interna-
tional law awards immunity from the host country’s 
jurisdiction and the execution of judgments creates an 
additional barrier for domestic workers seeking to 
access justice and compensation from their employers, 
leading to a situation of de facto impunity for rights 
violations.
1.1 European Level
At the regional level, the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a recommenda-
tion on “Domestic Slavery”2 in 2001, in which it called 
for a number of measures to prosecute and prevent 
domestic slavery and to protect the rights of the vic-
tims thereof, as well as an amendment of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations so as to exclude 
diplomatic immunity for all offences committed by 
diplomats in private life. In a 2004 follow-up resolu-
tion,3 PACE recommended the adoption of a charter of 
rights of domestic workers, which should, among oth-
ers, recognize domestic work as labor.
Member States of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have addressed traffick-
ing into domestic servitude more broadly in a number 
of policy commitments.4 More specifically, violations 
of the rights of domestic workers employed in diplo-
mats’ households have been put on the agenda of a 
conference of the Alliance against Trafficking in Per-
sons titled “Unprotected Work, Invisible Exploitation. 
Trafficking for the Purpose of Domestic Servitude”, 
organized by the OSCE in Vienna in June 2010. The 
issue was also addressed in a research paper with the 
same title published by the Office of the OSCE Special 
Representative on Trafficking in Human Beings. The 
study concludes with a number of recommendations 
addressed to the organization and its Participating 
States, including measures to prevent rights violations 
Endnotes
1  See http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/de/projekt-zwangsarbeit-heute.html.
2  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly 2001: Recommendation 1325, Domestic Slavery, 26 June 2001.
3  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly 2004: Recommendation 1663, Domestic Slavery: servitude, au pairs and “mail order brides”, 
22 June 2004.
4  Including OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, adopted by Permanent Council Decision No. 557 of 24 July 2003; 
Ministerial Council Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings for Labor Exploitation, 29 and 30 November 2007.
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committed by diplomats and staff members of inter-
national organizations to enhance the access of private 
domestic workers to assistance and redress.5
1.2 International Level
At the level of the United Nations (UN), the Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Wom-
en (CEDAW Committee) in its General Recommenda-
tion No. 26 on Women Migrant Workers issued in 2008 
has raised abuse, violence and other forms of discrim-
ination against women migrant domestic workers per-
petrated by diplomats while enjoying diplomatic immu-
nity as an obstacle to ensure women’s access to justice. 
The Committee recommended States Parties to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination against Women (CEDAW) to train and supervise 
their diplomatic and consular staff to ensure that they 
protect the rights of women migrant workers abroad, 
including through providing interpreters, medical care, 
counseling, legal aid and shelter.6
More recently, the UN Special Rapporteur on Contem-
porary Forms of Slavery in her latest report to the 
Human Rights Council explored how the specificities 
of domestic work as an industry put domestic workers 
at risk of economic exploitation, abuse and domestic 
servitude. The report identifies a “net of dependency 
factors” that prevent domestic workers from leaving 
situations of exploitation, including payment in kind, 
prohibitions to freely change employers, forcing work-
ers to live with their employers, withholding food, 
water or essential medical care, and physical and psy-
chological abuse. For migrant domestic workers 
employed by diplomats or international civil servants 
with diplomatic status, the report points to a “specif-
ic protection gap”, due to the dependency of the work-
ers’ visa status on the ongoing employment relation-
ship and diplomatic immunity which shields abusive 
employers from enforcement of national legislation. 
The Special Rapporteur criticizes the fact that host 
countries often lacked the courage to request waivers 
of immunities and declare abusive diplomats personae 
non gratae. Her recommendations to governments 
include the abolishment of visa regimes that tie a visa 
to a single employer, including for domestic workers 
employed by diplomats, and the diligent investigation 
and prosecution of alleged abuse or exploitation com-
mitted by diplomats. Where sending states of diplo-
mats do not take criminal action, host states should 
demand that immunity be waived or declare diplomats 
personae non gratae, while granting independent res-
idence rights to victims.7
Furthermore, the UN Committee on Migrant Workers 
in January 2011 published its first General Comment 
on “Migrant Domestic Workers”, in which it analyzes 
human rights violations experienced by migrant 
domestic workers as well as protection gaps of both a 
legal and practical nature. The Committee recommends 
States parties to the Migrants Rights Convention, 
among others, to “ensure that migrant domestic work-
ers can obtain legal redress and remedies for violations 
of their rights by employers who enjoy diplomatic 
immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomat-
ic Relations.”8 Recently, the rights of migrant domestic 
workers have also been put on the agenda of the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) where currently a 
legally binding Convention, supplemented by a Rec-
ommendation, concerning decent work for domestic 
workers is being drafted. However, the draft docu-
ments9 which will be further discussed at the next ses-
sion of the International Labour Conference in June 
2011 contain no specific references to domestic work-
ers employed in diplomats’ households.
1.3 Non-Governmental Organizations
The issue of rights violations experienced by domestic 
workers employed by diplomats has also been addressed 
by several non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
These organizations have contributed to raising aware-
ness of the issue and bringing it to the agenda of gov-
ernments and international bodies. To give a recent 
example, a group of seven European NGOs has recent-
ly come up with a comprehensive catalog of joint rec-
ommendations directed at governments, focusing in 
particular on domestic workers’ access to justice and 
their immigration status in the host countries.10
5  Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings 2010: p. 66.
6  UN, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2008: General Recommendation No. 26 on Women Migrant 
Workers, CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R, 5 December 2008, paragraph 21.
7  Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Including its Causes and Consequences 2010: paragraphs 33, 57, 58, 96.
8  UN, Committee on Migrant Workers 2011: General Comment on Migrant Domestic Workers: CMW/C/GC/1, 23 February 2011, paragraph 49.
9  International Labour Office 2011.
10  Ban Ying (Berlin), BLinN (Amsterdam), CCEM (Paris), Kalayaan (London), LEFÖ (Vienna), Migrants Rights Centre Ireland (Dublin) and 
PAG-ASA (Brussels) 2011.
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2.1 Aim of the Study
The study seeks to document examples of breaches of 
law experienced by domestic workers working in pri-
vate households of diplomats in select host countries 
and to analyze legal and institutional responses and 
their application vis-à-vis bearers of diplomatic immu-
nity in select European countries, with a focus on the 
exploitation of domestic workers in diplomatic house-
holds. By providing an overview of recent developments 
in Europe and identifying examples of promising prac-
tice, the paper aims to offer a basis for discussion and 
support the efforts of governments and NGOs to 
improve the access to justice for trafficked persons.
2.2 Scope of the Study
The study focuses on practices in six European coun-
tries in their capacity as host states for foreign diplo-
matic missions and international organizations: Aus-
tria, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom. In addition, select developments from 
Ireland and the Netherlands are also reflected. Unless 
explicitly stated otherwise, the overview of mecha-
nisms, procedures and legislation (chapters 4.2. and 
4.4.1.) and their assessment by interview partners refer 
exclusively to the six focus countries.
The question of how these states, as sending states, 
deal with alleged misconduct of their own diplomatic 
staff abroad in terms of prevention and holding staff 
accountable has not been covered by the present 
research project.
The study addresses the employment of domestic work-
ers in private households of diplomats with a focus on 
their access to justice following rights violations com-
mitted by diplomat employers:
n	While the term “diplomat”, in line with the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (hereinafter: 
Vienna Convention), refers to persons with 
diplomatic rank working in a state’s diplomatic 
mission abroad (including bilateral embassies and 
permanent representations with international 
organizations), the study also covers international 
civil servants with diplomatic status employed by 
international organizations. In so far as the latter 
possess diplomatic privileges and immunities, the 
procedures governing the employment of private 
domestic workers are identical to those applicable 
to diplomat employers in the narrow sense, as 
are the obstacles faced by domestic workers in 
seeking justice and compensation from their 
employers.
n	”Private domestic workers” – or “private servants”, 
as they are called in the Vienna Convention - are 
employed by individual diplomats in their private 
homes to perform household-related chores. 
Strictly speaking, they need to be distinguished 
from domestic workers employed by a diplomatic 
mission (“members of the service staff”, according 
to the Vienna Convention). While this distinction 
is easily blurred in practice, especially when a 
service staff member de facto works in the private 
household of the ambassador, it is important, 
in particular because service staff members are 
employed by the sending state and not by an 
individual diplomat. Therefore, their employer 
is, in labor-law related disputes, covered by the 
regime of state immunity, which international law 
defines more narrowly than diplomatic immunity 
(see chapter 3.3. below).
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2.3 Methodology
Six countries have been selected as main focus coun-
tries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom. The following selection cri-
teria have been applied: existing practice in regard to 
legal proceedings and/or negotiations involving domes-
tic workers seeking redress from diplomat employers; 
existing formal or informal mechanisms to enable 
domestic workers to report rights violations; active and 
experienced NGOs; large international community 
because of presence of international organizations. 
These criteria have been used flexibly, so not all coun-
tries fulfill all criteria.
In these countries, interviews with Foreign Ministries 
(mainly Protocol departments), NGOs, lawyers as well 
as the Geneva-based Office of the Amiable Composi-
teur11 were conducted. In addition, information 
obtained from NGOs from Ireland and the Netherlands 
as well as the Dutch Protocol department was also 
taken into account. Interview partners were selected 
through snowball-sampling. They deserve particular 
thanks for their time and for their willingness to share 
their knowledge. Please refer to the annex for a list of 
all interview partners.
In July and August 2010, semi-structured telephone 
interviews with ten NGOs in the eight countries men-
tioned above were conducted, which served to obtain 
basic information on the status quo in the respective 
countries and to identify potential interview partners 
for in-depth interviews. Subsequently, interview part-
ners in the six focus countries have been identified and 
were contacted for in-person interviews and interview 
guides have been developed. While contents of these 
interview guides varied according to four target groups 
(Foreign Ministries, NGOs, lawyers and the Office of 
the Amiable Compositeur), they were semi-structured 
and broadly focused on the following topics: qualita-
tive and quantitative aspects of identified cases of 
rights violations experienced by domestic workers 
through diplomat employers; admission and monitor-
ing procedures governing the entry and employment 
of domestic workers and their practical application; 
diplomatic measures to respond to alleged rights vio-
lations and their practical application by Protocol 
departments; experiences with legal proceedings and/
or out-of-court negotiations and the role of different 
actors, in particular Protocol departments and NGOs.
Between September and November 2010, in-depth 
interviews with representatives of six Foreign Minis-
tries, seven NGOs, three lawyers and the Office of the 
Amiable Compositeur were conducted. With three 
exceptions,12 these interviews were conducted in-per-
son in the capitals of the six focus countries as well as 
in Geneva. Besides the six focus countries, an in-person 
interview was also held with the Irish NGO Migrant 
Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI). NGO interview partners 
covered a broad thematic spectrum ranging from traf-
ficking in human beings/women to migrants, migrant 
domestic workers, domestic slavery and violence 
against women.
Most interviews were recorded, with the consent of 
the interview partners, and transcribed. Some inter-
views were summarized on the basis of notes taken 
during the interview. Interview findings were analyzed 
based on the main focus areas reflected in the inter-
view guides. Besides findings from the exploratory and 
in-depth interviews, this paper is also based on a 
review of documents that have been provided by inter-
view partners and, to a limited extent, have been iden-
tified through desk research.
In April 2011, interview partners had the opportunity 
to comment on the results and to add recent key devel-
opments, which are reflected in the final version of 
this report.
11  The Geneva-based Office of the Amiable Compositeur (OAC) is facilitating the settlement of work conflicts that involve persons who 
enjoy diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities. For further information, see chapter 4.5.2.
12  The Protocol department of the German Foreign Ministry and the British NGO Kalayaan sent written responses to the interview guide. 
The interview with the Swiss lawyer interview partner was done via telephone.
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the International Legal Framework
3.1 Diplomatic Immunity
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 
1961 is the key international document codifying the 
standards regulating diplomatic immunity. As of 30th 
November 2010, the Convention has been ratified by 
187 out of 192 UN Member States, thus coming close 
to universal ratification.
The Convention awards different levels of privileges 
and immunities to the members of the diplomatic mis-
sion depending on their professional status. Its pream-
ble underlines that “the purpose of such privileges and 
immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure 
the efficient performance of the functions of diplo-
matic missions as representing States”.
“Diplomatic agents” who comprise the head of mission 
and the members of the mission with diplomatic rank 
(Art. 1 (d)), enjoy inviolability of their person, which 
prohibits their arrest and detention by the host state’s 
authorities (Art. 29) and inviolability of their residence 
which implies immunity from search, requisition, 
attachment or execution (Art. 30, Art. 22). Furthermore, 
they enjoy absolute immunity from the host state’s 
criminal jurisdiction. Immunity also exists in regard to 
administrative and civil proceedings, with three excep-
tions, including for professional or commercial activi-
ties exercised outside their official function (Art. 31 
(1)). While this exception covers for instance paid 
employment of a diplomat outside the mission or the 
provision of professional services for remuneration by 
a diplomat, the contract between a diplomat and a 
private domestic worker is generally considered not a 
“commercial activity”.13 Therefore, employment rela-
tionships between private domestic workers and dip-
lomats are not exempted from a diplomat’s immunity. 
Diplomats are not obliged to give evidence as witness-
es (Art. 31 (2)). Immunity also comprises immunity from 
execution, except for the three exceptions in regard to 
administrative and civil proceedings mentioned above 
and provided that the inviolability of the diplomat’s 
residence is respected (Art. 31 (3)). The Convention also 
specifies that immunity from the host state’s jurisdic-
tion does not exempt diplomats from the jurisdiction 
of their sending state (Art. 31 (4)).
Family members of diplomats who live in the same 
household, unless they are nationals of the host coun-
try, enjoy the same inviolabilities and immunities as 
diplomats (Art. 37 (1)). For other persons the scope of 
immunity is more narrowly defined: Diplomats who are 
nationals or permanent residents of the host state 
enjoy immunity from jurisdiction and inviolability only 
in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of 
their function (Art. 38 (1)). Members of administrative 
and technical staff and service staff of the mission 
have no diplomatic status but also enjoy immunity, 
albeit also to a limited extent.14 Private domestic work-
ers do not enjoy immunity, unless this is admitted by 
the host state (Art. 37 (4)). They are exempted from 
the host state’s social security provisions, provided that 
they are not nationals of the host state and possess 
social security coverage in the sending or a third state. 
If this exemption does not apply, diplomat employers 
need to provide for the workers’ social insurance, in 
line with the host state’s regulations. Even if the 
exemption applies, private domestic workers may vol-
13  Denza 2008: p. 305. 
14  Administrative and technical staff, unless they are nationals or permanent residents of the host state, and their family members, 
enjoy the same inviolabilities and immunities as diplomats, which includes full immunity from criminal jurisdiction. Immunity from 
administrative and civil proceedings, however, extends only to acts performed in the course of their duties (Art. 37 (2)). Members of 
service staff who are not nationals or permanent residents of the host state do not enjoy inviolability of their person and residence, 
and immunity from criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction is limited to acts performed in the course of their duties (Art. 37 (3)). 
If these staff members are nationals or permanent residents of the host state, they enjoy privileges and immunities only to the extent 
admitted by that state.
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untarily participate in the host state’s social security 
system, provided that such participation is permitted 
by the host state (Art. 33 (2)-(4)).
A diplomat’s immunity starts when s/he enters the host 
state’s territory in order to take up her/his post, or if 
s/he is already there, with the notification of her/his 
appointment to the host state’s Foreign Ministry (Art. 
39 (1)). As regards the end of immunity, the Conven-
tion distinguishes as follows: For acts performed “in 
the exercise of [the diplomat’s] function as a member 
of the mission”, immunity is indefinite and continues 
even after the diplomat has left the host country. In 
regard to acts performed in her/his private capacity, 
immunity ceases to exist when the diplomat’s func-
tions have come to an end, normally at the moment 
when s/he leaves the country or on expiry of a reason-
able period of time to do so (Art. 39 (2)). This includes 
employment contracts concluded between diplomats 
and private domestic workers. In addition, the Conven-
tion foresees two other possibilities for immunity to 
come to an end: waiving immunity or declaring a dip-
lomat persona non grata. A waiver of a diplomat’s 
immunity may be declared only by the sending state, 
not the diplomat her/himself (Art. 32 (1)), because the 
immunity aims to protect the interests of states, not 
to benefit individual diplomats. A waiver always needs 
to be explicit (“express” – Art. 32 (2)). If immunity from 
jurisdiction is waived, this does not automatically 
encompass immunity from execution of a judgment, 
for which a separate waiver is needed (Art. 32 (4)). 
Furthermore, the host state can declare a diplomat 
persona non grata at any time and without having to 
explain its decision. In that case, the sending state shall 
either recall or terminate the diplomat’s functions (Art. 
9 (1)). If it refuses to do, the host state may refuse to 
recognize the diplomat as member of the mission, in 
which case her/his function as diplomatic agent comes 
to an end (Art. 9 (2), Art. 43 (b)).
It is generally recognized that immunity is a proce-
dural bar and does not affect any underlying substan-
tive liability.15 Thus, while diplomats enjoying immu-
nity cannot be sued or prosecuted for breaches of law 
in the host country, they still remain under the obliga-
tion to respect the latter’s laws and regulations (Art. 
41 (1)). The procedural nature of immunity implies that 
as long as immunity persists any procedural steps 
against a diplomat are precluded, while her/his liabil-
ity for any committed violations of law remains unaf-
fected. As soon as immunity ceases to exist, however, 
for example in case of a waiver of immunity or the 
departure of the diplomat, the court may start or con-
tinue to proceed with the case. When assessing wheth-
er a diplomat possesses immunity, courts have to take 
into account the time when they examine the case, 
not the time when the conduct in question took place.16 
Thus, even if a diplomat possessed immunity at the 
time when committing the alleged rights violations 
legal proceedings against her/him are possible if s/he 
is not protected by immunity anymore at the time the 
matter is examined by the court.
3.2 Immunity of Staff Members of Inter-
national Organizations
According to the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations (1946), officials 
of the United Nations (UN) enjoy immunity from legal 
process, but only in respect of all acts performed in 
their official capacity (functional immunity). Countries 
that are seats of international organizations in addi-
tion have concluded bilateral agreements with the 
respective organization, which often contain further 
reaching regulations, providing high-ranking interna-
tional civil servants with the same privileges and 
immunities as diplomats.
3.3 State Immunity
Under the doctrine of relative state immunity which 
has been widely, albeit not universally, recognized by 
states, foreign states are immune from the host coun-
try’s jurisdiction only in regard to acta iure imperii (acts 
undertaken by a state in exercising its sovereign 
authority), but not for acta iure gestionis (acts of a 
private law nature). Consequently, state immunity is 
only granted in respect to acts which are exclusively 
expression of the sovereignty of a state. Whether an 
act is to be considered as sovereign or private depends 
on its character and aim. Therefore, specific disputes 
pertaining to employment contracts, which belong to 
the latter category, are not covered by state immunity 
and therefore may be taken to court. This distinction 
is a principle of international customary law recognized 
by many states.
15  Denza 2008: p. 311. 
16  Ibid.
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The distinction becomes relevant where a domestic 
worker is a member of the embassy’s service staff but 
de facto works in the private household of the ambas-
sador. Because the worker is employed by the sending 
state and not by an individual diplomat, her/his 
employer is, in labor-law related disputes, covered by 
the regime of state immunity, which international law 
defines more narrowly than diplomatic immunity.
Two international treaties deal with the issue of state 
immunity: the Council of Europe’s 1972 European 
Convention on State Immunity, which has to date 
been only ratified by eight countries, and the 2004 UN 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and their Property, which is not yet in force. Both 
Conventions exempt employment contracts from the 
scope of state immunity, albeit with certain limita-
tions.17
17  Article 5 of the European Convention on State Immunity, Article 11 of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and their Property.
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4.1 Rights Violations Experienced by 
Domestic Workers Working in Diplo-
mats’ Households
The following chapter highlights some quantitative and 
qualitative data collected through interviews with rep-
resentatives of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the 
Office of the Amiable Compositeur (OAC),18 NGOs and 
lawyers as well as background materials provided by 
interview partners.
4.1.1 Quantitative Dimension
The present research project did not pursue a quanti-
tative approach. Therefore and because of differences 
in regard to the nature (estimations, statistics) and 
reference periods of data provided by interview part-
ners, the collected data does not allow for substantive 
conclusions on the real extent or the predominance of 
certain types of violations over others. Figures tend to 
point to a relatively small number of rights violations 
in relation to the numbers of diplomats accredited and 
of private domestic workers registered in the host 
countries. However, it is not known how many cases 
remain unreported.
Nevertheless, some figures shared by interview part-
ners are showcased in the following in order to give 
the reader an impression of the extent to which insti-
tutions participating in this study are occupied with 
the phenomenon.
The following box compiles numbers of domestic work-
ers registered with Protocol departments to work in 
the private households of employers enjoying diplo-
matic, consular or international privileges and immu-
nities. It should be noted that these figures do not 
necessarily encompass all persons who work for dip-
lomats in the countries covered, but only those who 
are migrant workers and possess a special ID card19 
issued by the Protocol department to work in the host 
country. Workers that might have been recruited at the 
local labor market who possess the nationality of the 
host country, a different residence status or no regular 
status or workers who are declared as family members 
are not included.
Numbers of private domestic workers regis-
tered with Protocol departments20:
n Austria: 237 private domestic workers 
have been registered as of August 2010.21 
n Belgium: Approximately 200 new permits 
for private domestic workers are issued 
per year. As of October 2010, around 
500 private domestic workers and 200 
members of service staff employed by 
diplomatic missions but de facto working 
in a private household of a diplomat have 
been registered.
n France: Approximately 80 new permits 
are issued per year for private domestic 
workers. As of October 2010, an estimated 
400-500 private domestic workers have 
been registered.
18  For further information on OAC, a Geneva-based institution to facilitate settlements between diplomats and their employees, refer to 
chapter 4.5.2.
19  Private domestic workers employed by diplomats are provided with special ID cards from Protocol departments which serve as 
confirmation of their residence status in the host country.
20  Source: Interviews with Protocol representatives, unless indicated otherwise.
21  Statistics provided by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Protocol department, September 2010, on file with the author. Data included in 
this document is disaggregated by country of origin, age and gender of the domestic workers as well as by country of origin or the 
employers. 
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n Germany: 249 private domestic workers 
have been registered as of August 2010.
n Netherlands: 208 of which 74 are employed 
by staff of international organizations (as 
of May 2011).
n Switzerland: 533 private domestic workers 
have been registered (as of October 2010) 
in both Geneva and Berne. 
n United Kingdom: approximately 200-300 
permits for private domestic workers are 
issued per year.
As regards cases of alleged rights violations experi-
enced by domestic workers, representatives of Foreign 
Ministries and the Office of the Amiable Compositeur 
in Switzerland shared the following figures of cases 
brought to their attention (including a mix of statistics 
and estimates).22 Information on the nature of legal 
cases (labor law, criminal law) was provided only on 
an anecdotal basis.
Alleged rights violations by diplomat employ-
ers experienced by private domestic workers 
notified to Foreign Ministries and the Office 
of the Amiable Compositeur:23
n Austria: approximately 6-7 cases in the 
past 1 ½ years (March 2009 – September 
2010).
n Belgium: approximately 50 complaints 
received in 2009 (ranging from “tiny 
to bigger” cases). Per year, the Protocol 
department learns of an estimated 4 
alleged cases under criminal law.
n Germany: 11 alleged violations of labor 
law from January 2008 to mid 2010. No 
information was provided on criminal law 
cases.
n France: 1 case in 2010.
n Netherlands: 5 alleged rights violations 
over the last 4 years from 2007 to May 
2011.
n Switzerland: 62 cases, including 46 new 
cases have been handled in 2009 by the 
Geneva-based Office of the Amiable 
Compositeur (OAC).24 No figures were 
provided by the Foreign Ministry in 
Berne.
n United Kingdom: so far, 3 cases of 
trafficking in persons under investigation. 
No other cases under criminal law and 
no cases under labor law have ever been 
reported.25
As regards NGO data, most organizations interviewed 
for this study provided estimates, as clients employed 
by diplomats have not been captured separately in their 
statistics. Some NGOs have however compiled detailed 
statistics on this group and strategically used this data 
for evidence-based policy advocacy. For instance, 
Kalayaan (United Kingdom) has collected and analyzed 
client statistics26 and used this information in their 
submission27 to the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants for his latest United King-
dom country report.28 Other examples are the German 
NGO Ban Ying, which fed data resulting from its own 
client statistics and a survey among NGOs into a 
request to the UN CEDAW Committee to initiate an 
inquiry procedure against Germany in 2003.29 The 
Migrant Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI) is currently work-
ing with a sample of qualitative case studies in their 
22  The figures provided do not explicitly distinguish between private domestic workers and embassy service staff working in a diplomat’s 
household.
23  Source: Interviews with Protocol representatives, unless indicated otherwise.
24  Source: Statistics provided by OAC, October 2010 (on file with the author). These cases include both private domestic workers as well 
as service staff members (no breakdown of both categories available).The total of 62 includes preventative consultations (14) and cases 
that were not within OAC’s mandate and therefore rejected (7). For further information on OAC refer to chapter 4.5.2.
25  Alleged breaches of labor law suffered by overseas domestic workers would be notified to the United Kingdom Border Agency, not the 
Protocol. 
26  Kalayaan, Client statistics 2008-2009. These figures illustrate the kinds of rights violations experienced by the organization’s clients 
and their nationalities, based on a total sample of 51 cases (27 in 2008 and 24 in 2009).
27  Kalayaan and Anti-Slavery International 2009.
28  Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants 2010.
29  Ban Ying 2003: annex 4. These figures illustrate the gender, working and living conditions and countries of origin of private domestic 
workers working for diplomats and list the nationalities of the employers, based on a total sample of 10 cases.
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advocacy for legal and policy changes in Ireland’s immi-
gration regime as it affects private domestic workers 
employed by diplomats.30
The following box compiles statistics and estimates of 
private domestic workers working for diplomatic 
employers supported by NGOs, covering a broad range 
of cases from labor rights violations to trafficking in 
human beings.
Private domestic workers employed by persons 
with diplomatic or consular status and inter-
national civil servants supported by NGOs:31
n Austria: LEFÖ-IBF32 – overall, an estimated 
2-3 cases by year.
n	Belgium: Pag-Asa33 - an estimated 5 cases 
by year. OR.CA – an estimated 4-5 cases per 
year.
n	France: CCEM34 – 15 cases in 2009, in-
cluding diplomats but also other privi-
leged persons, such as members of royal 
families of government members of for-
eign states.
n	Germany: Ban Ying35 - an estimated 5-10 
new cases per year.
n	Ireland: MRCI36 – as of September 2009, 
legal proceedings had been ongoing in 
7 cases assisted by MRCI, including 4 
labor law cases and 3 presumed cases of 
trafficking for forced labor, which were 
referred to the police.
n	Netherlands: BLinN37 – so far, an estimated 
3-4 cases (as of August 2010).
n Switzerland: No figures provided.
n United Kingdom: Kalayaan38 - 24 cases in 
2009. Not all of them reported abuse and 
exploitation - some workers e.g. came to 
participate in English classes.39 Between 
April 2009 and March 2010, Kalayaan 
referred 9 private domestic workers 
employed by diplomats to the National 
Referral Mechanism (NRM) as presumed 
trafficked persons. Additionally, they 
referred four others under a Government 
pilot project forpresumed trafficked 
persons.
4.1.2 Qualitative Dimension
Interviews have revealed a broad spectrum of alleged 
rights violations reported by private domestic workers 
working in diplomats’ households on the part of their 
employers.
Interviewees pointed at a large share of labor rights 
violations in various degrees among the cases they had 
come across. When asked about typical cases, exam-
ples provided range from milder and/or fewer forms of 
rights violations to graver breaches that may have 
accumulated and/or extended over a longer period of 
time. On one end of the spectrum, interview partners 
listed breaches of labor law such as failure on part of 
the employer to pay the full wage or fully compensate 
the worker for extra hours or for unconsumed annual 
leave, or, in case of termination of the work contract, 
failure to respect legal notice periods or to pay indem-
nity. On the other end of the spectrum, examples of 
30  Migrant Rights Centre Ireland 2010. This document provides a qualitative analysis of a sample of six case studies with a focus on the 
worker’s working and living conditions, escape routes and efforts to access justice as well as key trends emerging. 
31 Source: Interviews with NGO representatives.
32 LEFÖ Intervention Centre for Trafficked Women (IBF) is based in Vienna and provides counseling and support to trafficked women. For 
further information, see http://www.lefoe.at/index.php/ibf.html. 
33   Pag-Asa is based in Brussels and provides counseling and support to trafficked persons. For further information, see http://www.pagasa.
be/. 
34  The Committee against Modern Slavery (CCEM) is based in Paris and provides counseling and support to victims of domestic slavery. For 
further information, see http://www.esclavagemoderne.org/. 
35  Ban Ying is based in Berlin and provides counseling and support to trafficked women and other migrant women who experienced 
violence. For further information, see http://www.ban-ying.de/pageeng/start.htm. 
36  The Migrant Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI) is a community-based organization in Dublin, which promotes migrant workers’ rights, among 
others through advocacy, information and referral services and supporting workers’ action groups. For more information, see http://
www.mrci.ie/. 
37  Bonded Labor in the Netherlands (BLinN), a joint program of the NGOs Humanitas and Oxfam Novib, is based in Amsterdam and 
provides counseling and support to trafficked persons. For further information, see www.blinn.nl,   
38  Kalayaan is based in London and provides advice, advocacy and support services for migrant domestic workers. For more information, 
see http://www.kalayaan.org.uk/. 
39  According to a survey conducted by Kalayaan, which was answered by at least 19 out of these 24 workers (response rates differed for 
the different questions), over 70 percent of respondents had not been allowed out, had no day off during the week, had to be on call 
24 hours, were paid £50 or less per week and/or had their passports withheld. 
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more severe violations include complete withholding 
of wages, forcing workers to work excessive hours 
without days off and without any or with inadequate 
compensation or failure to provide them with adequate 
accommodation and food. A number of interviewees 
mentioned restrictions of the workers’ freedom of 
movement – by prohibiting them to have social con-
tacts and to leave the house unaccompanied or by 
withholding their passports and special ID cards.
When asked about extreme cases, interview partners 
told about workers who had been forced to sleep on 
the floor, deprived of food apart from leftovers, denied 
basic hygiene and suffered physical, psychological and/
or sexual violence. Such cases involving slavery-like 
conditions were regarded as an exception rather than 
the norm by interviewees.
It emerged from interviews that the boundaries 
between “typical” and “extreme” cases were fluid. 
While some forms of rights violations might be part of 
either category, it was the combination of different 
forms of abuse and their duration that were relevant 
criteria.
The following example illustrates a “typical case” 
shared by the NGO Kalayaan. It is exemplary for the 
large number of cases that involve massive economic 
exploitation of a domestic worker’s labor, some form 
of restrictions of the worker’s freedom of movement, 
but no physical or sexual violence.
Maria40 is a woman in her forties from Indonesia. 
She was brought to the United Kingdom by a 
diplomat to work as housekeeper/cleaner. The 
employer made her work extremely long hours 
– sometimes 18 hours a day, with no day off in 
the week. She had to sleep on the floor in the 
hallway. Whenever she wanted to leave the 
house, she had to tell her employer when she 
would be leaving and when she would be back. 
Maria received only half of the salary she was 
promised before coming to the United Kingdom. 
Leaving the employer would have meant that 
she had to return to Indonesia. Returning home 
was not an option for Maria as she had to sup-
port her three children back home and pay back 
debts that she had incurred to leave her country 
for work originally.
An example of a case involving extreme rights viola-
tions is the case of “Ms Hasniati”41, reported by the 
NGO Ban Ying.
Ms Hasniati, a woman from Indonesia, had worked 
for four years (including two and a half years in 
Germany) in the private residence of a diplomat. 
She had to work up to 19 hours a day and never 
received any pay for her services. She was pro-
vided with only very little food of poor quality, 
was not allowed to leave the house and was 
subjected to physical violence. The employer kept 
Ms Hasniati’s special ID issued by the Protocol 
department and did not return her passport. Only 
after months of suffering from tuberculosis, Ms 
Hasniati was allowed to go to the hospital to 
seek medical care.
4.2 Legal and Procedural Frameworks in 
Host Countries Governing the Employ-
ment of Domestic Workers by Diplomats 
The following chapter highlights key elements of legal 
frameworks and administrative procedures put in place 
by host state governments to prevent, monitor and 
respond to rights violations experienced by private 
domestic workers employed by diplomats. Rather than 
presenting an in-depth legal analysis of the author, 
which would have exceeded the scope of the present 
study, this chapter provides an overview of relevant 
frameworks and procedures and their application, 
based on information shared by interview partners, 
unless indicated otherwise in the footnotes.
4.2.1 Admission and Monitoring Procedures
As private domestic workers working for diplomats in 
the countries covered by this study are usually non-EU 
citizens, they need a permit to obtain residence and to 
work in the respective host country. Usually, these per-
mits take the form of a special ID card issued by the 
Foreign Ministries’ Protocol departments. The present 
chapter provides an overview of the procedures put in 
place by governments regulating the entry and employ-
ment of domestic workers and the monitoring of work-
ing conditions in the host country.
40  The name was taken from the case study provided to the author by Kalayaan.
41  Pseudonym used by the NGO Ban Ying who had supported the domestic worker.
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4.2.1.1 Admission Criteria
Governments have set a number of admission criteria 
for the employment of domestic workers in diplomats’ 
homes, which differ among countries. Besides general 
factors such as majority age or the requirement that 
the worker must not be a family member of the 
employed, some of these criteria touch upon the 
domestic workers’ private and family life, as illustrat-
ed by the following examples.
Marital status of the employee
In Switzerland, for example, in order to work with a 
diplomat, domestic workers must be single, divorced 
or widowed.42 If, during employment, a worker gets 
married or if a female worker gives birth to a child in 
Switzerland, s/he ceases to fulfill the admission crite-
ria and therefore loses the special ID card after the 
expiry of the current work contract.43 Exceptionally, a 
married couple who has already worked for the same 
diplomat before may be authorized to accompany her/
him to Switzerland, provided that they will both con-
tinue to work for the same employer and that, if they 
have children, child care is guaranteed for their entire 
stay.44 Domestic workers employed by diplomats can 
only be joined by family members, if the latter fulfill 
the requirements under the general immigration and 
work permit system. Even in case this amendment will 
be adopted, it remains to be seen how feasible it will 
be for non-EU citizens to fulfill these requirements. 
The only countries covered by the present study where 
the possibility of a spouse to join a domestic worker 
of a diplomat in the host country exists, are France45, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Living conditions of the employee
Switzerland46 and Germany require domestic workers 
to live in the same household with the employer, unless 
the latter is unable to provide accommodation com-
plying with the required quality standards - in which 
case s/he has to pay for her/his employee’s separate 
accommodation. No legal requirement to live in the 
same household exists in Austria, France and the Neth-
erlands but in practice it is almost always the case. In 
Austria, similarly to Switzerland, the employer has to 
pay for renting additional space if s/he cannot make 
adequate accommodation available to the domestic 
worker, plus a higher minimum wage.47 A private 
domestic worker is in principle free to live separately, 
if s/he wishes, which however rarely happens in prac-
tice. In that case, s/he must cover the additional costs 
her/himself and confirm in writing that s/he voluntar-
ily chose not to live with the employer.
4.2.1.2 Application Procedure for Visas and Special 
Protocol ID Cards
As a general rule, it is not the individual diplomat, but 
the embassy, mission or international organization that 
applies for the visa of the prospective domestic work-
er prior to her/his arrival in the host country.
As regards the kind of documentation required, a vari-
ety of documents have to be submitted to the host 
country’s embassy abroad or the Protocol department 
of the MFA in the capital. Here, the requirements dif-
fer among countries. The United Kingdom government 
requests only a certificate of sponsorship signed by the 
employer, thus pursuing a light touch approach. Other 
countries covered by the study require a work contract 
signed by both parties and in line with the host coun-
try’s labor law standards, with Austria, Belgium and 
France providing obligatory templates, or a declaration 
signed by the employer and stamped by the embassy 
confirming that s/he respects national labor law and 
provides for the domestic worker’s accommodation, 
health insurance and return flight after the contract 
ends. While Germany requests accommodation of the 
domestic worker in a separate room “if possible”, in 
Austria and Switzerland, this is a mandatory require-
ment. The Protocol department in Vienna requests a 
copy of the employer’s lease and a map of her/his 
42  This criterion will be removed by the new Ordinance.
43  Département fédéral des affaires étrangères (DFAE), Directive sur l’engagement des domestiques privés par les membres du personnel 
des missions diplomatiques, des missions permanentes, des postes consulaires et des organisations internationales en Suisse, entrée en 
vigueur le 1er mai 2006, modifiée le 1er janvier 2010, paragraphs 3.22, 7.2.
44  Ibid.
45  Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (no date indicated). The spouse’s visa application is submitted to the Protocol department by the 
employer’s mission.
46  Département fédéral des affaires étrangères (DFAE), Directive sur l’engagement des domestiques privés par les membres du personnel 
des missions diplomatiques, des missions permanentes, des postes consulaires et des organisations internationales en Suisse, entrée en 
vigueur le 1er mai 2006, modifiée le 1er janvier 2010, paragraphs 3.1, 8.2.
47  For the government’s minimum wage scheme for domestic workers applicable in Vienna, see Bundeseinigungsamt beim 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Mindestlohntarif für im Haushalt Beschäftigte/Wien, § 2 paragraph A subparagraphs 
1-2, paragraph B subparagraphs 1-2.
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apartment/house clearly indicating a separate and ade-
quate living space for the domestic worker that must 
comply with existing health, building security and fire 
prevention regulations.
Since autumn 2010, Austria also requires the estab-
lishment of a bank account of the domestic worker as 
a prerequisite for the registration of private domestic 
workers and has notified diplomatic missions and inter-
national organizations that wage payments in cash are 
no longer accepted. When the employer requests an 
extension of a Protocol ID for a domestic worker, the 
Protocol department may request proof of bank trans-
fers of past salaries and, in case such evidence cannot 
be provided, will refuse the extension. While the set-
ting up of bank accounts is not obligatory in France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, the respective Protocol 
departments were in practice recommending domestic 
workers to do so.48
Once the visa has been approved, the worker is allowed 
to enter the host country where the employer, through 
the mission or international organization, applies for 
a special ID card issued by the Protocol department. 
This is the case in all countries but the United King-
dom, where the worker’s right to stay is confirmed 
solely by a vignette stamped into her/his passport with-
out a separate ID. In some countries, domestic workers 
are required to pick up their special ID in person from 
the Protocol department (see chapter 4.2.1.3). As a 
rule, special ID cards are issued for a limited period of 
time, initially mostly for one year. When extending the 
card’s validity, the French as well as the Dutch Proto-
col department choose a shorter period, if there are 
grounds to suspect problems in the employment rela-
tionship. In that case, the ID is issued only for a period 
of three to six months; after this period, the worker is 
requested to come to the Protocol department to pick 
up her/his renewed ID and given an opportunity to 
update the Protocol department on the employment 
situation, so that the latter can consider further steps. 
A similar approach exists in Belgium. In the United 
Kingdom, the overall duration of the vignette is lim-
ited to six years and in Germany the duration of the 
special ID card is limited to five years, with the possi-
bility to re-enter after one year.
In order to inform employers of the relevant procedures 
and applicable labor law standards in the host country, 
Foreign Ministries have issued notes verbales that are 
distributed to employers, diplomatic missions and 
international organizations. In most countries, Proto-
col departments also provide employers with model 
contracts, which, in varying degrees of detail, specify 
the cornerstones of the employment relationship. In 
some countries, written information on their legal 
rights is also provided to private domestic workers: 
Besides a comprehensive leaflet published by the Swiss 
Foreign Ministry in eight languages49 and the Dutch 
Foreign Ministry in nine languages50 information mate-
rials identified in the course of this study have mainly 
been produced by NGOs.51
4.2.1.3 Monitoring of Ongoing Employment Rela-
tionships by Protocol Departments
The screening of documentation during the application 
and renewal process provides a possibility for MFAs to 
monitor the compliance with labor laws and employ-
ment contracts in work relationships between private 
domestic workers and diplomats.
In addition, Protocol departments in some countries 
have personal meetings with domestic workers . Upon 
arrival in the host country,52 workers in Austria, Bel-
gium, Switzerland and with some exceptions in France53 
have to come to the Protocol department unaccom-
panied to pick up their special ID card. During these 
meetings, they also receive information on the relevant 
administrative procedures, their rights and possibilities 
to obtain support. Further meetings are scheduled 
when the workers’ IDs are due for renewal and at a 
later stage if needed, in order to give them an oppor-
tunity to seek further information and to bring any 
concerns relating to the employment relationship to 
the Protocol department’s attention. In Switzerland, 
such follow-up meetings are currently held only on a 
case-by-case basis, but the government is planning to 
48  Circular Note 7/2003 of the Federal Foreign Office, published in Ban Ying 2008: p.12ff.
49  Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2010.
50  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2011.
51  Ban Ying 2008: Geneva Forum for Philippine Concerns 2000. Furthermore, the King Baudouin Foundation in Belgium in 2005 published 
a brochure titled “Working as a Homehelp at the Private Residence of a Diplomat”.
52  At least three countries foresee that, before entering the host country, domestic workers pick up their visa in person at the embassy 
abroad.
53  In France, the Protocol department invites domestic workers living in Paris and surroundings to personal meetings. For workers living in 
other parts of France, ID cards are being sent to the mission of the diplomat’s sending country or the international organization.
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replace the current system by introducing regular fol-
low-up meetings. In Germany, according to the Foreign 
Ministry, personal meetings between the Protocol 
department and domestic worker are not foreseen as 
standard practice, but may be held at the request of 
the domestic worker. The German MFA is currently dis-
cussing a new route for reporting rights violations: 
according to the Protocol department, the setting up 
of an emergency telephone number or special e-mail 
address to enable confidential reporting is being con-
sidered.
The United Kingdom is the only country among the six 
examples covered by this study where there is no per-
sonal contact between the MFA and the domestic 
worker.
In one of the countries, an NGO providing counseling 
and support to trafficked women is participating in the 
personal contact between the Protocol department and 
the domestic worker: When there are grounds to 
believe that rights violations occurred in the employ-
ment relationship, the Protocol department invites the 
NGO to come to the Ministry to meet the domestic 
worker. The aim is to enable the worker to report rights 
violations to a person specialized in psycho-social 
counseling and to identify strategies for support in an 
atmosphere of trust. This is the only example among 
the countries covered in this research of NGOs par-
ticipating in meetings of Protocol department and pri-
vate domestic workers.
As mentioned above,54 some MFAs require or encour-
age the opening of a bank account of the domestic 
worker, in order to facilitate the proof of salary pay-
ments in case of a dispute. In some countries the MFA 
requests the employer to prove bank transfers of sala-
ries when considering the extension of a Protocol ID 
card for private domestic workers, or in case of sus-
pected rights violations.
4.2.1.4 Assessment by Interview Partners
Overall MFA representatives seemed satisfied with 
existing regulations and procedures. Among the 
strengths or gaps pointed out, a few specific issues 
were raised, besides a number of comments of a rath-
er general nature such as “the system could be 
improved” or “you could always do more”. NGO inter-
viewees, even where progress was noted, pointed to a 
need for further improvements, as outlined in the fol-
lowing.
Monitoring of Ongoing Employment Relationships
Personal contact between the Protocol department 
and domestic workers was regarded as an important 
measure by Foreign Ministry representatives in coun-
tries where this is being practiced. The Belgian inter-
viewee noted that this approach put in place by her 
MFA seven years ago had made an enormous differ-
ence as a lot more cases of rights violations were now 
being brought to the Protocol department’s attention. 
This positive assessment was joined by the Belgian NGO 
representative, who also noted, however, that language 
barriers might sometimes prevent domestic workers to 
report problems as translators might not always be 
available.
Several NGO interviewees underlined the importance 
of personal meetings between Protocols and domestic 
workers. One NGO representative believed that in her 
country, where no such personal contact was current-
ly taking place, the retaining of the workers’ documents 
by their employers – an experience that most of their 
clients had made – could be prevented by having pri-
vate domestic workers pick up their documents in per-
son at the Protocol department. For such meetings to 
be effective, the creation of a climate of trust with the 
domestic worker was considered crucial, which would 
sometimes require a lot of time. In the country where 
a NGO was attending meetings of the Protocol depart-
ment with the domestic workers in case of suspected 
rights violations, the Ministry and the NGO interview-
ee concurred in a positive assessment of this coopera-
tion. The Protocol representative underlined the added 
value of the presence of an NGO who had expertise in 
dealing with victims of rights violations and was trust-
ed by both the Ministry and the domestic worker.
Challenges brought up by NGO and government inter-
viewees included language barriers and reluctance of 
domestic workers to speak openly to the Protocol offi-
cial about abuses experienced, mainly due to intimi-
dation by their employers. As regards the skills and 
capacities of Protocol staff in dealing with reports of 
rights violations, some Foreign Ministry interviewees 
tended to be of the opinion that no additional efforts 
in terms of sensitization were required as those staff 
members who were in contact with domestic workers 
54  See chapter 4.2.1.2.
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had acquired the necessary skills over the years through 
training on the job. Sporadic criticism was voiced from 
the NGO side that Protocol staff lacked the necessary 
capacities and sensitivity to deal with human traffick-
ing cases and expressed concern that the Protocol 
department leant closer to the side of diplomats.
The requirement of setting up a bank account was 
considered by NGO and government interviewees a 
powerful tool to facilitate proof as to whether salaries 
had been paid – which was seen as protecting the 
interests of both workers and employers. At the same 
time, concerns were raised that some migrant domes-
tic workers might not be familiar with the host coun-
try’s banking system, and that, with regard to MFA’s 
role and resources, the Protocol department would not 
be in a position to provide assistance in this regard. 
Admission Criteria
Several interview partners expressed serious concern 
that the requirement for private domestic workers to 
live in the same household with the employer increased 
their risk of exposure to abuse and exploitation, com-
pared to those who come to work and leave after work. 
In particular NGO representatives identified the 
requirement of living in the diplomat’s household 
alongside the fact that the worker’s immigration sta-
tus was tied to the employer as a main factor contrib-
uting to the structural dependency of domestic work-
ers on their employers.55 
4.2.2 Immigration Status – Characteristics and 
Possibilities to Switch 
As a general rule, the special immigration status of 
domestic workers is accessory to the continuation of 
the employment relationship and their employer’s stay 
in the host country and therefore does not allow them 
to switch their employer. That also implies that, once 
the work relationship has ended – be it due to expiry 
of the contract, the end of the diplomat’s posting or 
the termination of the work relationship by either side 
– the domestic worker loses her/his right to stay and 
work in the host state’s territory.
A few limited exceptions to this general principle have 
been identified by interviewees, as will be summarized 
in the following. While interviewees neither provided 
specific figures on residence permits awarded to 
domestic workers employed by diplomats through oth-
er avenues nor elaborated on the respective legal pre-
requisites, it was understood that such permits would 
be awarded on a case-by-case basis and constituted 
the exception rather than the rule.
Switching within the Diplomatic Community
Most countries covered by the study provide for a lim-
ited exception by allowing switching employers with-
in the diplomatic community within a certain period 
of time (usually one month) after the work contract 
has ended. In the Netherlands it is required that the 
two contracts are performed in a continuous sequence. 
The Foreign Ministry is currently reviewing this prac-
tice with regard to giving the domestic worker more 
time to find a new employer in cases of abuse or exploi-
tation. That possibility does not exist at all in Germa-
ny and in the United Kingdom it is restricted to new 
employers who work in the same diplomatic mission. 
The British government has announced a review of its 
overall visa policy as regards domestic workers work-
ing in private and diplomat households for the begin-
ning of 2011.
In case a private domestic worker has fled an abusive 
work relationship, some Foreign Ministry representa-
tives said they would informally try to assist her/him 
finding a new job by linking her/him up with a poten-
tial new employer, should they be aware of someone 
within the diplomatic community looking for domestic 
personnel. At the same time it was underlined that, in 
light of its role and mandate, the Protocol department 
could only play a limited role in this regard. An insti-
tution explicitly mandated to provide such job 
exchange services exists in Switzerland: The Geneva 
Welcome Centre56, an institution founded in 1996 by 
the Swiss Federal Government and the Canton of Gene-
va, runs a database of diplomats offering employment 
and of domestic workers in possession of a special per-
mit issued by the Protocol department. The aim is to 
assist both sides – the domestic workers in finding a 
job within 30 days following the end of the working 
relationship and the potential employer in quickly find-
ing appropriate personnel. Services are provided free 
of charge.
Interview partners have identified examples of 
approaches to legalize the status of domestic workers 
for a limited time period that some Protocol depart-
55  See also Kalayaan 2010a: 1 and Migrant Rights Centre Ireland 2010: p. 2.
56  Website of the Geneva Welcome Centre http://www.cagi.ch/en/vie-pratique/travail/bourse-emploi-personnel-maison.php (visited 26 
November 2010).
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ments have either applied in the past and/or would 
consider in the future, within their margin of discre-
tion. This included the exceptional renewal of the spe-
cial ID card in cases of serious rights violations where 
no other option was available to the domestic worker 
to enable her/his stay in the host country for the dura-
tion of legal proceedings against the former employer, 
where such proceedings were legally possible (see 
chapters 4.3. and 4.4.). Another example mentioned 
was the provision of a confirmation letter to a worker 
having fled an abusive work relationship stating that, 
for the period specified in the letter, the person remains 
in the territory with the knowledge of the Protocol 
department, in order to enable her/him to engage in 
out-of-court negotiations. These examples were based 
on discretionary decisions on the part of Foreign Min-
istries, rather than on legal entitlements of domestic 
workers.
Switching to the Anti-Trafficking Framework
For rights violations amounting to trafficking in human 
beings, special assistance and protection, including 
temporary residence status, is in theory available to 
workers who have been identified by the authorities 
as presumed trafficked persons. While regulations dif-
fer among countries as regards the definition of traf-
ficking and the duration of and/or prerequisites to 
obtain residence status, a common feature is that this 
status is limited to the duration of criminal proceed-
ings and linked to the applicant’s cooperation with law 
enforcement. In addition, trafficked persons may obtain 
long-term or indefinite residence status beyond the 
duration of proceedings, for example in Belgium (pro-
vided that the prosecutor brings a charge against the 
trafficker)57 or in France and the Netherlands (if a court 
judgment has been obtained).58 In France and the Neth-
erlands there also exists the possibility of obtaining 
residence status on humanitarian grounds where there 
has been no court case or the case has not resulted in 
a conviction (Netherlands), when proceedings end with 
a judgment that is not in favor of the trafficked per-
son, for example because of diplomatic immunity 
(France) or when proceedings are ongoing but do not 
require the presence of the trafficked person anymore 
(Switzerland).59
Interviewees mentioned a few cases in which private 
domestic workers employed by diplomats had been 
able to obtain such temporary or long-term residence 
permits under anti-trafficking legislation. In Austria 
for example, a few years back, some domestic workers 
employed by diplomats had obtained short-term resi-
dence permits under the anti-trafficking framework, 
including in cases where due to the diplomat’s immu-
nity no legal proceedings could be instituted.
In France, the legislation was not precise as to wheth-
er long-term residence permits for trafficked persons 
required a judgment by a criminal court or a labor 
court. In some cases, domestic workers had been 
awarded long-term residence status on the basis of 
convictions of former employers before labor courts 
(see chapter 4.4.2.1. for examples of cases in which 
courts have issued judgments against employers with 
diplomatic status). Belgium is the only country where 
an explicit regulation on assistance and protection of 
trafficked persons in the context of diplomatic immu-
nity exists.
In Belgium, the residence status of trafficked 
persons is linked to criminal prosecution and 
their cooperation with law enforcement, as well. 
In the case of domestic workers employed by 
diplomats, however, criminal prosecution is usu-
ally not an option, given the diplomatic status 
of their employers. The government sought to 
address this gap by integrating a specific section 
on “victims of trafficking working for diplomatic 
personnel” into the Ministerial Circular of 26 
57  European Commission, Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings, National Info Page Belgium, http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/
showNIPsection.action?country=Belgium (visited 6 March 2011).
58  Sources: Information provided by the French NGO interviewee; European Commission, Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings, 
National Info Page The Netherlands, http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/showNIPsection.action?country=Netherlands (visited 6 March 
2011).
59  Sources: Information provided by the French NGO interviewee; European Commission, Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings, 
National Info Page The Netherlands, http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/showNIPsection.action?country=Netherlands (visited 6 March 
2011); Verordnung über Zulassung, Aufenthalt und Erwerbstätigkeit, adopted on 24 October 2007, as of 24 January 2011, Article 36 
paragraph 6 (available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/1/142.201.de.pdf, visited 25 May 2011).
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September 2009 dealing with multidisciplinary 
cooperation in the field of assistance to traf-
ficked persons.60 This circular states that, in cas-
es where the employer’s diplomatic status ren-
ders criminal proceedings impossible, an opinion 
issued by the prosecutor (Magistrate de Ministère 
Public)61 confirming the situation of trafficking 
and exploitation shall be sufficient for an official 
recognition as a victim of trafficking and subse-
quently the issuance of a residence permit. When 
establishing the relevant facts, the magistrate 
shall consider the statement of the worker and 
other specific elements of the file. The prosecu-
tor may undertake all appropriate measures, in 
cooperation with the Protocol department, to 
prove the existence of the crime, while respect-
ing the rules governing diplomatic immunity. On 
the basis of this provision, private domestic 
workers in practice receive permanent residence 
permits, once there has been a positive advice 
from the prosecutor. During the inquiry and as 
long as there is no such advice, they are award-
ed a temporary residence permit of six months.
Switch to Regular Residence Permit System
Foreign Ministry sources also mentioned instances of 
domestic workers working for diplomats who had been 
able to switch to the regular residence and work per-
mit system. In Austria, a small number of domestic 
workers have in the past been able to switch from the 
Protocol ID to a residence permit for employed persons, 
issued by the immigration authorities. While that per-
mit was again limited to domestic work for diplomats, 
it allows the worker, after seven years, to apply for 
unlimited residence status. Even though this channel 
is apparently not well known, it has been successfully 
used in a number of cases according to the Protocol 
department. In the United Kingdom, migrant domestic 
workers can apply for settlement (i.e. indefinite leave 
to remain) after a period of five years, if they have 
resided legally as a full-time domestic worker in the 
country during that period.62 According to the Protocol 
department, in 2009 settlement was granted to a total 
of 795 persons employed in households of both private 
persons and diplomats (no figures were available as to 
the share of domestic workers employed by diplomats 
in that group).
Another – exceptional – possibility for domestic work-
ers to change their residence status are broader regu-
larization campaigns by the government. From Belgium 
it has been reported that a very small number of 
domestic workers have been able to switch to regular 
residence permits as part of such a campaign in 2000. 
A second round of regularization is currently pending 
– it remains to be seen how many domestic workers 
will be able to benefit from it.
4.2.2.1 Assessment by Interview Partners
In particular for non-state interview partners, the 
immigration status of private domestic workers – both 
during the ongoing employment relationship as well 
as after the worker left the diplomat’s household – 
constituted a key concern. It was criticized that the 
dependency of the domestic worker’s status on the stay 
of the employer and the continuity of the work rela-
tionship created and perpetuated dependencies and 
unequal power relationships.63 Combined with the 
employer’s diplomatic status and the economic pres-
sure faced by many migrant domestic workers as they 
have to pay back loans and are sending money back 
home to support their families, these factors were 
regarded as preventing the workers from accessing 
justice.
Several interviewees from Foreign Ministries regarded 
the system of awarding residence permits as part of 
existing National Referral Mechanisms to assist and 
protect trafficked persons a viable option to enable 
private domestic workers who fled exploitative work 
60  Circulaire relative à la mise en œuvre d’une coopération multi-disciplinaire concernant les victimes de la traite des êtres humains 
et/ou de certaines formes aggravées de trafic des êtres humains, 26 September 2008 (available at http://www.diversite.be/index.
php?action=wetgeving_detail&id=67&select_page=12, visited 25 May 2011). In line with general requirements of anti-trafficking 
legislation, the circular states that, in order to be eligible for recognition as a victim of trafficking, a domestic worker needs to be 
supported by a specialized victim support center, make a statement or file a lawsuit, renounce the work relationship and return the 
special ID to the Protocol.
61  Magistrate within the Prosecutor’s Office.
62  For further information on the possibilities for migrant workers to apply for settlement, refer to the UKBA website: http://www.ukba.
homeoffice.gov.uk/workingintheuk/othercategories/domesticworkers/settlement/ (visited 10 December 2010).
63  This gap has also been addressed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery in her most recent report dealing 
with domestic servitude, in which she identified the lacking possibility to switch employers as an element of “neo-bondage” and as a 
factor contributing to a “net of dependency factors from which the victim cannot extract herself”. Special Rapporteur on Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery, including its Causes and Consequences 2010: paragraphs 33, 48, 57.
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relationships that qualify as human trafficking to legal-
ly remain in the country for the duration of proceed-
ings, after their special ID has lost its validity. How-
ever, non-state actors questioned the extent to which 
domestic workers employed by diplomats were in fact 
benefitting from this protection. The conditional link 
between residence status and criminal proceedings 
poses an obstacle because diplomatic privileges and 
immunities often render criminal proceedings virtu-
ally impossible. In this context, the Belgian Ministe-
rial Circular of 2009 was considered a positive step, as 
it offers a way around the conditional link.
Some interviewees pointed to the ambiguity of nation-
al laws and practice as regards the nature of proceed-
ings required and the resulting lack of clarity as to 
whether labor court proceedings or out-of-court nego-
tiations would be a sufficient basis for the worker to 
receive a residence permit, or whether criminal pro-
ceedings needed to be instituted. Other gaps men-
tioned included the case-by-case approach used by 
authorities in handling applications, which made the 
outcomes difficult to predict, and long duration of pro-
ceedings, which creates a situation of limbo for the 
domestic worker after having left her/his work place. 
4.3 Measures under International  
Diplomatic Law and their Application  
in Practice
A number of measures are at the disposal of Protocol 
departments in host countries in response to reports 
on alleged rights violations committed by foreign dip-
lomats in the context of the employment of private 
domestic staff. While some measures have an explicit 
basis in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions such as declaring a diplomat persona non grata 
or requesting the waiver of her/his immunity, others 
are of a more informal and less far-reaching nature, 
for instance raising the matter with the ambassador 
of the diplomat’s sending state.
Foreign Ministry interviewees noted that the selection 
of appropriate measures depended very much on the 
circumstances of the individual case and that it was 
therefore difficult to specify which measures would be 
considered, or in fact applied, under which circum-
stances. Overall, interviews revealed that the measures 
taken tended to lean rather towards the lenient spec-
trum, whereas the more severe measures foreseen in 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, such 
as requesting waivers of immunity or declaring a dip-
lomat persona non grata, are considered measures of 
last resort and are being rarely, if at all, applied.
4.3.1 Informal Measures at the Diplomatic Level
MFA interview partners mentioned a number of exam-
ples of diplomatic measures at their disposal that are 
being applied in practice vis-à-vis the sending state or 
the international organization and/or the diplomat.
n Raising the matter with the ambassador or di-
rector of the international organization to re-
quest an explanation and facilitate the settlement 
of the case. Such exchange takes place behind 
closed doors, without involvement of the domes-
tic worker or a representative of her/him.
n Delay or refusal in issuing permits for domestic 
workers if the diplomat or mission has a bad track 
record in employment matters. In some countries 
Protocol departments have occasionally resorted 
to this measure. While interviewees did not 
specify how often or under which circumstances 
this measure would be put into practice, some 
explained that when considering an application, 
they would take into account whether any cases 
of rights violations reported in the past have 
remained unsettled and insist that any persisting 
issues be solved before accepting the registration 
of a new domestic worker.
n Threats to withdraw or actual withdrawal of 
unilateral privileges, such as exemptions from 
value-added taxes (VAT), were mentioned by 
Protocol interview partners from at least two 
countries as reaction to breaches of host country 
laws by diplomats in general. In one country 
(Belgium) these measures have been applied to 
involving rights violations of domestic workers. 
It was underlined that such measures needed to 
be chosen in a way that they did not negatively 
influence the diplomat’s ability to perform her/his 
official duties.
n Informal exchange with Protocol counterparts 
in other countries on employers with a negative 
track record in employing private domestic 
workers.
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4.3.2 Diplomatic Measures Foreseen in the 
Vienna Convention
It emerged from the interviews that severe diplomatic 
measures are being very rarely applied, and if, mainly 
in cases of severe labor exploitation or trafficking in 
human beings.
As regards the more severe measures established by 
the Vienna Convention, interview partners from For-
eign Ministries in at least four countries (Austria, Bel-
gium, Switzerland, United Kingdom) referred to cases 
where they had requested the sending country or inter-
national organization to waive the employer’s immu-
nity in cases of rights violations reported by domestic 
workers. While no figures on the number of requests 
could be provided, interviews revealed a spectrum of 
responses, as demonstrated by the following examples. 
According to the representative from the Protocol 
department in the United Kingdom, if the MFA was 
being approached by the police with a request for a 
waiver of immunity, it was standard practice to pass 
on that request to the foreign mission. If the waiver 
was not accepted, the Protocol department would 
request the diplomat’s withdrawal - that was done in 
at least one case involving trafficking in human beings 
brought to their attention in 2008. In France, the 
threshold for requesting waivers seems to be higher: 
According to the French Protocol interview partners, 
the government considered requesting waivers in gen-
eral as a measure of last resort and would most likely 
do so only in very serious cases, such as if a diplomat 
was suspected of having killed somebody. In Germany, 
no waivers in cases involving rights violations of pri-
vate domestic workers had so far been requested. 
The following case of exploitation of a domestic work-
er, in which immunity had eventually been waived and 
the employer was consequently taken to court, has 
been documented by the French NGO Comité contre 
l’Esclavage Moderne (CCEM).
This case involved a criminal law suit against a 
high-level diplomat and former Prime Minister 
working with an international organization in 
Paris who, together with his wife, had allegedly 
exploited his wife’s two nieces as domestic work-
ers. The girls had been 13 and 9 years old, respec-
tively, when they fled the war in Burundi in 1994. 
C., the older girl, had to take care of the family’s 
household seven days per week, 16 to 17 hours 
per day and look after six of the couple’s seven 
children. She was not allowed to leave the house 
and had her passport taken away. Both girls were 
subjected to degrading living conditions.64 After 
the Director of the international organization 
had waived immunity following a request from 
the host country’s prosecutor, the employer was 
put to trial. Despite his efforts to challenge the 
court’s jurisdiction by invoking immunity, the 
Supreme Court eventually confirmed that French 
courts were competent to deal with the case – 
among others, because the international organ-
ization had waived the employer’s immunity.
At the upper end of the spectrum of diplomatic meas-
ures foreseen by the Vienna Convention on Diplomat-
ic Relations is the declaration of a diplomat as per-
sona non grata . Following such a declaration, the 
sending state shall either recall the diplomat or termi-
nate her/his functions with the mission (Art. 9 Vienna 
Convention), which means that the diplomat can be 
held accountable for rights violations before the host 
state’s courts like any other person. According to For-
eign Ministry representatives, in none of the countries 
covered by the study, use had ever been made of the 
possibility of a non grata declaration. MFAs usually 
consider a declaration persona non grata as a measure 
of last resort and therefore first warn the mission or 
international organization that unless the case could 
be settled the diplomat would be asked to be with-
drawn.
When asked if and under which circumstances Foreign 
Ministries would consider declaring a diplomat per-
sona non grata – both in cases of abuse of a private 
domestic worker and more generally -, some MFA rep-
resentatives stated that they might consider this meas-
ure in very serious cases, if all other measures had 
failed. Examples provided of other cases where a per-
sona grata declaration had been made included very 
serious criminal offences such as murder, terrorism or 
espionage, but, according to Denza, the procedure has 
also been applied to large patterns of illegal parking 
by diplomats, as had been the case in the United King-
dom.65
64  Website of CCEM, www.esclavagemoderne.org (visited 15 July 2010).
65  Denza 2008: p. 86.
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In practice, it was considered difficult to distinguish 
whether a diplomat left as a result of a persona non 
grata declaration by the host state or because of a 
withdrawal by her/his sending state without such a 
declaration. The following case illustrates an example 
of a case that came close to a persona non grata dec-
laration:
In Austria, in a case that involved allegations of 
labor rights violations (non-payment of wages 
and compensation for overtime) and physical 
violence committed against a domestic worker 
by her employer, the repeated interventions of 
the host country’s Foreign Ministry with the dip-
lomat’s embassy failed to result in a successful 
settlement of the case. However, as a conse-
quence, the diplomat was withdrawn by the 
sending country, one year before her posting 
ended. According to the Protocol department, 
this case de facto amounted to a declaration 
persona non grata, without the Ministry having 
had to declare it as such.
4.3.3 Assessment by Interview Partners
Foreign Ministry representatives tended to regard leni-
ent diplomatic measures an appropriate response to 
reported rights violations. Measures such as the refus-
al of or delayed issuing of permits for domestic work-
ers or the withdrawal of unilateral tax privileges for 
employers with a bad track record had been found 
effective in a material sense in various occasions as 
they helped to substantially increase the motivation 
of employers to agree to a settlement and to make 
remuneration payments to the domestic worker.
While more severe measures were in principle deemed 
appropriate in the context of domestic work – at least 
in cases involving very serious rights violations - the 
scope of application of such measures was considered 
substantially restricted because of the hidden nature 
of domestic work and the inherent difficulties in prov-
ing rights violations alleged by private domestic work-
ers. Whereas traffic violations could be proven more 
easily (e.g. through tickets stating the violation in writ-
ing), this was more difficult for rights violations com-
mitted in the hidden sphere of the home, where one 
person’s word stood against the other’s.
While Foreign Ministry interviewees tended to empha-
size the ultima ratio character of diplomatic measures 
foreseen under the Vienna Convention, non-state 
actors were of the opinion that Foreign Ministries 
should be more proactive in applying such measures, 
in particular the declaration persona non grata, in 
domestic servitude cases. NGO representatives and 
lawyers pointed to examples in which, in their opinion, 
the severity of the case would have justified the appli-
cation of measures of last resort foreseen in the Vien-
na Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The case of 
“Ms Hasniati”, who had been subjected by her employ-
er to conditions amounting to de facto slavery, includ-
ing massive violations of her labor rights and freedom 
of movement (see chapter 4.1.2), was mentioned as an 
example where a declaration persona non grata would 
have been appropriate.
A number of interviewees across all target groups 
pointed to the political dimension and the potential 
impact on country’s bilateral relations as explanations 
for the rare application of severe diplomatic measures. 
As one NGO representative put it, while some individ-
ual Ministry officers might be open and sensitive to 
the need for applying more severe measures, their lee-
way was limited by their government’s high-level dip-
lomatic and political interests. Some interviewees 
pointed to the resistance of sending countries to waive 
immunity as a challenge, whereas one NGO represent-
ative suggested that this argument might be used as 
a pretext by host country Protocol departments to jus-
tify their own inaction. The important role of NGOs in 
lobbying their governments to exert pressure on other 
states to lift immunity was underlined.
Some interviewees suggested that it made a difference 
for the potential impact of diplomatic measures 
whether their counterpart was a bilateral mission or 
an international organization. International organiza-
tions were perceived more receptive than bilateral rep-
resentations when it came to insisting on their own 
staff members’ compliance to comply with their legal 
obligations under contractual arrangements and the 
host country’s laws and to granting waivers of immu-
nity. While bilateral missions usually withdrew their 
staff in case of problems, that was not the case for 
international civil servants so there was a better 
chance of exerting pressure, in particular with inter-
national organizations who were mandated to work 
on human rights and rule of law issues. Furthermore, 
governments often refused to accept the host state’s 
jurisdiction over their diplomats by arguing that they 
should be sued back home in front of their own courts, 
while international organizations did not have that 
option.
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4.4 Legal Proceedings
The very nature of diplomatic immunity implies that 
diplomats are exempted from the jurisdiction of the 
host country‘s authorities. That means a substantial 
restriction of the possibilities of private domestic work-
ers to access justice against their employers. Never-
theless, given the fact that immunity primarily aims to 
protect the sending state’s, and not the individual dip-
lomat’s, interests, it should be kept in mind that per-
sons enjoying diplomatic privileges are not exempted 
from the duty to observe the host country’s laws,66 but 
that merely legal proceedings are barred for the time 
immunity exists. This implies that for instance when 
the diplomat’s immunity has been waived by the send-
ing country, legal proceedings may be undertaken 
against her/him like any other person. Similarly, after 
the diplomat’s posting and consequently her/his immu-
nity for acts committed in a private capacity has end-
ed, s/he can be taken to court for these acts. Further-
more, the jurisdiction of the sending country over its 
diplomats remains untouched – thus maintaining the 
option of pursuing legal claims in that country. For an 
overview of the relevant standards set by the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, refer to chapter 
3.1.
The following chapter addresses interview partners’ 
experiences in using legal proceedings as an avenue 
for private domestic workers to seek redress against 
rights violations committed by diplomatic employers. 
While the analysis mainly focuses on the six core coun-
tries covered by the research (Austria, Germany, Bel-
gium, France, Switzerland, United Kingdom), it also 
takes up experiences shared by NGO interview partners 
from Ireland and the Netherlands with relevant expe-
riences concerning legal proceedings. 
4.4.1 Applicable Labor Law Standards
According to information provided by interviewees, as 
a general rule, private domestic workers employed by 
diplomats are covered by national labor law standards 
in all countries investigated as part of the study, apart 
from specific admission criteria (see chapter 4.2.1.1). 
In most countries, the employers and/or missions or 
international organizations need to confirm, through 
signing a declaration of commitment or note verbale, 
that they have taken note of the applicable legislation 
pertaining to the employment of the private domestic 
worker. In Austria67 and France68, for example, that also 
includes an explicit obligation not to take the domes-
tic worker’s passport and Protocol ID away.
In most countries covered, private domestic workers 
employed by diplomats are theoretically covered by 
regulations establishing minimum wages. The amounts 
established by laws, directives or collective agreements 
often differ according to criteria such as the years of 
work experience and whether food, accommodation 
and social security are included or not. Therefore, and 
also because national minimum wages are based on 
different numbers of regular work hours, ranging from 
35 hours per week in France to 238 hours per month 
in Austria, a cross-country comparison of amounts is 
difficult. The German Protocol department in its Cir-
cular Note 6/2004 reminds foreign diplomats that 
these amounts reflect minimum levels only and are not 
equivalent to distinctly higher wages commonly paid 
for this kind of work in Germany. Only some countries’ 
model contracts provided by Foreign Ministries contain 
references to the legal minimum wage.
The Swiss government is currently preparing a new 
federal Ordinance regulating the working conditions 
for private domestic workers employed by diplomats, 
in order to overcome the current fragmentation at can-
tonal levels.69 Among others, it is planned to introduce 
a federal minimum wage through the Ordinance.
As regards health and/or social insurance, in at least 
three countries (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland) private 
domestic workers are mandatorily covered by the state 
insurance system, unless they possess equivalent insur-
ance in a third country (based on a bilateral agreement 
between the latter and the host country) or private 
insurance. In France, private domestic workers cannot 
be covered under the state health and social insurance 
system and therefore must get private health insur-
ance to be paid by the employer. The range or risks 
covered by state social insurance differs by countries 
– for instance, whereas Switzerland covers health, acci-
66  Art. 41 (1) Vienna Convention.
67  Bundesministerium für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten 2009: Zirkularnote BMeiA-AT.1.35.01/0018-I.1b/2009, 23 October 
2009, p. 2 (on file with the author).
68  Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes, Attestation (à joindre au contrat d’engagement d’un personnel privé) (on file with the 
author).
69  The Ordinance is expected to enter into force at the beginning of July 2011. It will be available under www.eda.admin.ch
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dent, invalidity and pension insurance, in Austria, only 
health insurance is comprised. The Austrian Protocol 
interviewee considered accident insurance for private 
domestic workers to be covered by the employer’s obli-
gation to bear all costs of assistance and medical care 
which might arise to Austrian public entities due to 
the domestic worker’s entry and sojourn in Austria, as 
undertaken in the employer’s declaration of commit-
ment.
4.4.2 Legal Proceedings: Procedures, Claims and 
Outcomes
Due to the very nature of diplomatic immunity which 
exempts diplomats from the jurisdiction of the host 
countries’ courts, interviews have overall revealed lim-
ited experiences with legal proceedings against diplo-
mat employers.
4.4.2.1 The Role of Diplomatic Immunity in Legal 
Proceedings
Interview partners shared examples of cases where 
courts considered themselves competent to deal with 
claims raised by private domestic workers against dip-
lomat employers. Overall, interviews revealed that legal 
proceedings fail to provide private domestic workers 
with legal certainty as regards the relationship between 
violations of individual rights and diplomatic immu-
nity.
n Immunity had never existed – for example where 
the presumed diplomat turned out to be a lower 
rank staff member of a diplomatic mission or 
international organization whose immunity was 
therefore limited to acts undertaken in her/his 
official capacity, or a family member of a diplomat 
who possessed the nationality of the host state 
and therefore did not enjoy immunity. In practice, 
it may be difficult to distinguish between the 
status of these employers and those enjoying 
immunity. 
n Immunity had ceased to exist – for example after 
an international organization had agreed to waive 
immunity of its employee, or after the diplomat’s 
functions had come to an end, at which point s/he 
no longer possessed immunity for acts performed 
in her/his private capacity.
n The worker was employed not by an individual 
diplomat, but by the government of the sending 
state . Even though the employee had worked 
in the ambassador’s private residence, her/his 
employment contract had been signed by the 
diplomatic mission of the ambassador’s sending 
state, not the ambassador her/himself. Therefore, 
the matter was to be addressed under the 
doctrine of state immunity, rather than diplomatic 
immunity. Under that doctrine, foreign states are 
immune from the host country’s jurisdiction only 
in regard to acta iure imperii (acts undertaken 
by a state in exercising its sovereign authority) 
and therefore may be taken to court in regard 
to disputes pertaining to employment contracts, 
which qualify as acta iure gestionis (acts of a 
private law nature) – a principle of international 
customary law recognized by many states. 
n Failure of diplomat to appear in court: 
Interviewees reported instances where Labor 
Courts in Belgium, France, Ireland, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom had considered themselves 
competent to hear the case because the diplomat 
had not participated in the proceedings and failed 
to raise the defense of diplomatic immunity. 
Therefore, it was found that the diplomat did 
not benefit from immunity, and in several cases, 
judgments were issued in favor of the domestic 
workers, as illustrated in the following examples. 
In the case of “Alia”, a domestic worker employed 
by a diplomat in the United Kingdom, a lawyer 
submitted a claim on behalf of her in the labor 
court for several violations of labor law, includ-
ing sexual harassment, breaches of working time 
regulations and failure to pay the national min-
imum wage. The court considered itself compe-
tent to hear the case because the employer had 
not invoked diplomatic immunity70 and awarded 
“Alia” compensation amounting to approximate-
ly £ 80.000. However, because of the diplomat’s 
departure, “Alia” could not enforce this judg-
ment.
A domestic worker from Sri Lanka came to France 
where he worked in the private household of a 
high-level diplomat. Over a period of about one 
year, he worked from 7AM to 10 PM every day, 
70  The Guardian 2010: Does immunity breach a victim’s human rights? 30 August 2010.
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without a day off and did not receive his full 
wage as agreed in the contract. He had no room 
on his own and had to sleep on a folding bed. 
His passport had been taken away and he was 
not allowed to leave the house unaccompanied. 
After he fled to the NGO CCEM, he sued his 
employer before the Labor Court. The employer 
had been summoned but did not participate in 
the proceedings. The court condemned the dip-
lomat to pay his former employer an overall 
amount of approximately EUR 14,000, including 
compensation for unpaid wages, unconsumed 
annual leave and unlawful dismissal.71 The 
employer did not appeal the judgment. Howev-
er, the domestic worker could not enforce his 
entitlements because of the diplomat’s immu-
nity from execution.
This argumentation points to efforts of individual judg-
es to apply regulations on immunity creatively, but also 
to gaps in the knowledge on the concept of immunity, 
given the fact that in order to be valid, waivers of 
immunity need to be explicit and can only be granted 
by the sending state, not an individual diplomat. While 
providing a moral victory to domestic workers, such 
judgments are unlikely to enable domestic workers to 
access compensation and remuneration, given the fact 
that diplomat employers are unlikely to accept judg-
ments that override international diplomatic law and 
also with a view to immunity from enforcement.
n State liability for damages suffered: A recent 
judgment by the French Administrative Supreme 
Court demonstrates an alternative channel for 
domestic workers to obtain compensation – 
namely from the host state.
The domestic worker who had worked for a dep-
uty delegate of a member State’s permanent rep-
resentation to Unesco had been awarded com-
pensation against her former employer amount-
ing to around EUR 33,400, including for unpaid 
wages, by a Court of Appeal. The employer 
appealed but the second instance court upheld 
the judgment in favor of the domestic worker.72 
However, the worker was not able to obtain any 
payments from the employer because of the lat-
ter’s immunity from execution. The Administra-
tive Supreme Court73 found that, under the doc-
trine of state liability independent of negligence 
which exists in France, the French government 
was liable to pay compensation to the domestic 
worker. That doctrine provides for liability of the 
state in cases where an international convention 
signed by France (here: the Vienna Convention 
Diplomatic Relation, which applied through 
analogy) has an unintended significant negative 
effect upon a small group of people. The group 
was defined by the Court as those domestic 
workers employed by diplomats who had 
obtained a judgment by a French Court, but 
could not enforce it because of immunity from 
execution.
4.4.2.2 Procedures and Claims
The majority of cases that interview partners had been 
notified of and/or worked with concerned proceedings 
under labor law before labor courts or semi-judicial 
bodies and/or criminal law proceedings.
Examples of labor law claims include primarily pay-
ment of outstanding salaries, compensation for over-
time work, unconsumed annual leave or dismissals in 
violation of legal notification periods, but also payment 
of outstanding social security premiums, compensa-
tion following sexual harassment or reinstatement 
after illegal dismissals. The amounts claimed covered 
a broad range, depending on the amount of the legal 
minimum wage in the respective country (which, 
according to several interviewees constituted a core 
component of the claims), the duration of the employ-
ment relationship and the extent to which the worker 
had or had not been paid in the past. Amounts can be 
quite substantial. To take an example shared by a law-
yer from United Kingdom, recent claims included 
amounts of £ 30.000 (where the contract had lasted 
only for eight months, but the domestic worker had 
worked many extra hours) up to possibly £ 150.000 in 
a case where the employment relationship lasted for 
years. The following case also showcases how rights 
71  Conseil de Prud‘hommes de Paris RG n° F 05/06486, 4 January 2006.
72  The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court did not address the issue of immunity from jurisdiction. According to the French 
NGO interviewee, the employer most likely could not rely on immunity because of his very appearance in court.
73  Conseil d’Ètat 2011: n° 325253, 11 February 2011.
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violations continuing over longer periods of time can 
amount to quite substantial claims.
In a case taken on by the Irish NGO MRCI, the 
labor law claims of “Ali”,74 a driver and cook who 
was paid a US$ 150 per month for 105 hours of 
work per week added up to approximately EUR 
60,000, over an employment period of two years. 
“Ali” had to be on call throughout the night, 
without breaks or pay for work on Sundays, pub-
lic holiday or annual leave. He had to sleep in 
the basement in a room without heating or nat-
ural light. He was not allowed to leave the house 
and had his passport returned only when he vis-
ited his home country on holidays. “Ali” left the 
employment and remained in Ireland in order to 
obtain remuneration based on his entitlements 
under Irish employment law.75
Only very rarely have domestic workers initiated pro-
ceedings before civil courts, even in cases involving 
physical violence and/or deprivation of the workers’ 
freedom of movement. 
As regards cases that had been referred to the crimi-
nal justice system, in a number of countries, including 
Austria, Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom, this 
was done under the criminal offence of trafficking in 
human beings. Other relevant offences identified by 
interview partners included bodily injury, rape, coer-
cion, or wage usury.
In the majority of cases, domestic workers faced dif-
ficulties to provide evidence of the rights violations 
they had experienced. While embassy drivers could use 
their daily logbooks to document their work, such an 
option was not available to domestic workers. There-
fore, in most cases, there would be the word of the 
domestic worker against the word of the employer. 
That gap was exacerbated in cases where the domes-
tic workers had been deceived or coerced into signing 
blank receipts or receipts indicating higher amounts 
than those actually received, a practice experienced 
by interviewees in some countries.
Some NGOs, in their daily counseling work, have been 
recommending domestic workers the following ways 
to document rights violations: taking notes to docu-
ment key facts such as work hours, times of going to 
bed or the kind of work undertaken; writing down 
names of persons who might be able to confirm work-
ing hours, such as neighbors, guests served at recep-
tions or parents met at the playground or at school; 
keeping record of discussions with the employer; keep-
ing receipts of money transfers to their accounts back 
home; taking photos to document living conditions. 
MFA representatives mentioned bank statements prov-
ing the transfer of wages as a useful means of evidence 
– for both sides, the domestic worker and the employer.
4.4.2.3 Outcomes of Legal Cases
The majority of interview partners said they had not 
been aware of any cases that resulted into convictions 
against diplomats before criminal, labor or civil courts 
and/or actual payments by diplomats. In Belgium, 
France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, interview 
partners referred to a number of cases in which labor 
courts had found themselves competent to hear the 
case and awarded payments to private domestic work-
ers through judgments that were issued in absence of 
the employer. In these cases the employer had failed 
to respond to the claims and to participate in the legal 
proceedings (see chapter 4.4.2.1.).
The only country in which interview partners recalled 
a few examples of labor court judgments that resulted 
in actual payments by employers to private domestic 
workers was Switzerland. While exact figures could 
not be provided, one interviewee had observed a ten-
dency of international civil servants being most likely 
to comply with court judgments, followed by states 
(i.e. embassies or missions as employers of service per-
sonnel), while according to the interviewee’s experi-
ence, individual diplomat employers would only rarely 
pay amounts ordered by courts.
When it came to criminal proceedings, interviewees 
observed a strong tendency on the part of criminal 
justice authorities to prematurely close cases and only 
in isolated cases had come across judgments. Diplo-
matic immunity of the employer, lack of evidence to 
indict and the departure of diplomats were among the 
reasons for closing cases listed by interview partners. 
74  Pseudonym used by MRCI.
75  MRCI 2010: p. 5f.
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4.4.3 Assessment by Interview Partners
Overall Added Value of Legal Proceedings
Interview partners had different views on the overall 
value of legal proceedings in the context of the pre-
sent study, in the light of the limitations inherent to 
diplomatic immunity.
At the level of enforcement of the rights of individ-
ual domestic workers, the impact of legal proceedings 
was considered rather limited. Against the background 
of diplomatic immunity, legal proceedings in the major-
ity of cases were unlikely to result in enforceable 
results for domestic workers in the strict legal sense. 
Even though a few cases resulted into labor court judg-
ments, this was far from providing private domestic 
workers with legal certainty and offering a systemat-
ic response to their inability to seek justice from dip-
lomat employers.
n Interview partners across all categories pointed 
to the difficulty to prove rights violations 
committed in work relationships in diplomat’s 
private households, especially as regards non-
payment of wages and, even more, overtime work. 
The employer’s right to privacy in general and 
diplomatic immunity and inviolability of the home 
in particular have been identified as obstacles 
preventing police and labor inspectors from 
entering the work place and collecting evidence 
(see below).
n A number of interviewees questioned the value of 
a judgment that might take a very long time to 
obtain but in the end could not be enforced: Even 
in those few cases where domestic worker had 
managed to overcome the hurdle of the employer’s 
immunity from jurisdictional immunity and to 
obtain a conviction of the diplomat, diplomatic 
immunity from enforcement posed an additional 
obstacle. Apart from legal constraints – even if 
jurisdictional immunity were waived, a separate 
waiver would be required to enable the host 
country to enforce the judgment – the likelihood 
of successful enforcement was restricted by the 
fact that diplomats most often have left the 
host country’s territory and moved their assets 
abroad. Knowing from the beginning that legal 
proceedings, once instituted, would most likely 
have to be closed and legal entitlements could not 
be awarded because of the employer’s diplomatic 
status was often a great frustration for domestic 
workers.
n Interview partners expressed concern about the 
tendency of some labor courts to quickly override 
immunity, often without providing a well-
reasoned justification in the judgment, which 
might put them at risk of being seen to break 
diplomatic law. While such judgments might 
provide domestic workers with a moral victory, 
they fail to provide a solid basis for enabling them 
to access their legal rights. 
n Court judgments establishing the facts of the 
case, while not providing enforceable rights, 
could however be of pragmatic use. For example, 
on the basis of judgments, domestic workers 
might in individual cases be able to obtain 
residence permits or access state compensation 
funds. Furthermore, some interviewees found that 
the initiation of legal proceedings could increase 
pressure on individual diplomat employers to 
engage in out-of-court proceedings or to agree 
to settlements - this potential was however seen 
to depend on the duration and quality of legal 
proceedings.
A number of NGOs concluded that, with all the uncer-
tainties involved (long duration of court proceedings 
and police investigations; lack of adequate support and 
protection infrastructure and unclear residence status, 
in particular in cases of labor rights violations not 
amounting to human trafficking; risk of having to bear 
procedural costs; little chance of obtaining a judgment 
and if so, of being awarded more than the minimum 
wage) a lot was at stake for their clients when consid-
ering whether or not to initiate legal proceedings, while 
having very little chance of a satisfactory outcome. 
Therefore, explaining to the clients the options and 
implications was key for NGOs and lawyers. One law-
yer explained that advice to the clients would basi-
cally come down to the following: “If you want moral 
recognition – go to court. If you want money, it’s bet-
ter to negotiate.” The lawyer also criticized that given 
the de facto impossibility to obtain and/or enforce 
judgment, legal proceedings completely missed the 
purpose of prevention – rather than having a deterrent 
effect, law suits would reinforce the idea that “you can 
get away with it”.
Overall, interview partners tended to attribute added 
value to legal proceedings rather at the structural lev-
el .
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n Several Foreign Ministry representatives 
underlined the importance of using the judicial 
path and that there was no alternative for a 
country with certain rule of law standards to 
stick to those. Interviewees agreed that obtaining 
a judgment gave the domestic worker a sense of 
justice and official recognition of the injustice 
experienced.
n Strategic litigation has been identified by non-
state interviewees as a useful entry point in order 
to challenge the large patterns of unsuccessful 
cases in European countries which reveal systemic 
gaps in the implementation of state obligations 
under international human rights law, in 
particular to protect domestic workers employed 
by diplomats from slavery and servitude and to 
guarantee them access to justice. Moreover, the 
importance of using international human rights 
law in national litigation was flagged by a lawyer 
who hoped that, once a claim of a domestic 
worker against a diplomatic employer would be 
successfully litigated in her country, diplomats 
and embassies might be more willing to engage 
in proceedings. 
n From an NGO perspective, cases taken to court 
and their outcomes have also proven a useful 
basis for lobbying the government to tackle 
structural shortcomings and for awareness raising 
and campaigning purposes.
The Role of Preliminary Proceedings in Criminal Law
The potential of criminal proceedings was underlined 
by interviewees in particular in regard to cases of rights 
violations qualifying as trafficking in human beings. 
Some interviewees have observed progress in the 
responses of criminal justice actors. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that increased sensitivity of police and pros-
ecutors on issues around diplomatic immunity has had 
a positive impact on the outcome of individual cases. 
Where criminal justice authorities thoroughly investi-
gate and prosecute rights violations reported by private 
domestic workers within the legal boundaries of immu-
nity, domestic workers have been able to obtain the 
status of victims of trafficking (see chapter 4.2.2.) and 
subsequently to obtain residence permits and access 
state-funded support facilities.
Besides such examples of progress, many NGO inter-
view partners and some Foreign Ministry representa-
tives expressed concern about gaps in the response of 
police and prosecutors to cases involving alleged rights 
violations committed by diplomats against private 
domestic workers. A key point was the overall reluc-
tance on part of criminal justice actors to take action 
against diplomats, which manifested itself in the fail-
ure to record reports made by domestic workers, the 
tendency to drop cases quickly without fully exploring 
the options for investigating cases allowed by inter-
national diplomatic law and the failure to follow exist-
ing procedures. Some interview partners also found 
that the authorities might not be sufficiently familiar 
with how far they were allowed to go in investigating 
cases against diplomats within the boundaries of inter-
national diplomatic law. Another bottleneck identified 
concerned the resistance of the criminal justice system 
towards recognizing the exploitation of domestic 
workers and trafficking for forced labor as a matter of 
criminal law – an issue that was found to concern pro-
ceedings against diplomatic and private employers 
alike.
Impact of diplomatic measures for the enforce-
ment of civil claims
A number of NGO representatives were of the opinion 
that Protocol departments should do more to push for 
waivers of immunity and, in case a judgment was deliv-
ered, for compliance with the court’s ruling.
Interviews also revealed that the application of diplo-
matic measures in practice may have a negative impact 
on the enforcement of domestic workers’ labor rights: 
Even if immunity were waived, it was likely that the 
diplomat would immediately depart, thus rendering 
legal steps in the host country and the enforcement of 
a judgment very difficult. As one of the lawyers put it: 
“Obtaining a waiver might be a diplomatic victory for 
the host country, but in practice it brings no advantage 
for the victim.”
4.5 Out-of-Court Negotiations
Given the protection of diplomats under international 
law and the fact that diplomatic immunity from juris-
diction and execution is rarely waived by sending 
states, out-of-court negotiations have in practice pro-
vided often the only and so far most effective option 
for domestic workers to obtain compensation and 
remuneration from employers with diplomatic status. 
Most interview partners have reported experiences 
with extra-judicial negotiations as an avenue to settle 
claims of private domestic workers against diplomatic 
employers.
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4.5.1 Nature and Amount of Claims
Interviews have revealed that claims negotiated have 
almost exclusively been based on labor law. Similar to 
what was said for legal proceedings, claims included 
payment of wages, remuneration for overtime work or 
unconsumed annual leave, payments of social secu-
rity premiums, as well as compensation or reinstate-
ment following illegal dismissal during sickness or 
pregnancy. In a number of cases, the ticket for the 
return flight for the domestic worker was also part of 
the negotiation package.
Civil law claims, such as for reimbursement of medical 
expenses or compensation for pain and suffering were 
hardly ever pursued, and if at all, as part of a lump sum. 
Explanations provided by interviewees included that 
they either had not come across a lot of cases involv-
ing violence, or that they were less familiar with that 
area of law and so far had not thought about raising 
civil claims. Obviously, the mandate of the complaint 
mechanism put in place also played a role: while for 
example the Geneva-based Office of the Amiable Com-
positeur is specialized on settling labor law, civil law 
claims are not a major focus of its work.
As for legal proceedings, the amounts of claims raised 
by domestic workers in negotiations may range from 
smaller to larger scales, depending on the duration of 
the employment relationship and the extent to which 
due payments have or have not been made in the past. 
It appears from the interviews that the wage compo-
nent is usually based on the respective country’s legal 
minimum wage. This allows for the conclusion that in 
practice, employment contracts do not go beyond this 
amount, thus stipulating it as rule, rather than a min-
imum standard that may be exceeded by the parties. 
Examples of figures shared by interview partners 
ranged from one month’s wage up to EUR 200,000. For 
instance, in a case reported by an interviewee from 
Austria that had involved severe exploitation and vio-
lence, the claims as calculated by the lawyer who had 
represented the worker in the negotiations amounted 
to around EUR 30,000 for unpaid wages, overtime, 
additional allowances provided by labor law and dam-
ages for harm and suffering.
4.5.2 Settings of Negotiations and Actors 
Involved
In most countries Protocol departments played some 
role in facilitating negotiations between private 
domestic workers and their employers, with different 
degrees of involvement. Besides the transmission of 
information on alleged cases to the embassy or inter-
national organization concerned and the request for a 
statement, which seems a common feature of all For-
eign Ministries’ role, Protocol representatives from 
Austria explicitly and Belgium to a certain extent 
regarded their role as being a mediator and neutral 
convenor of private domestic workers and diplomats. 
A more cautious approach was reflected in interviews 
with Foreign Ministry officials from Germany and Swit-
zerland who stated that their departments might be 
involved in negotiations in a mediating capacity, albe-
it only on an exceptional basis. For Switzerland it was 
explained that this role was mainly played by the Gene-
va-based Office of the Amiable Compositeur (OAC – 
see below), an institution specialized in mediating labor 
law related disputes. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the United Kingdom Protocol department, according 
to its representative, was not aware of any negotia-
tions that might have taken place among parties and 
played no role in facilitating those.
In some countries other state actors get involved in 
facilitating settlements between domestic workers and 
their employers. The Geneva-based Office of the Ami-
able Compositeur (OAC) is facilitating the settlement 
of work conflicts that involve persons who enjoy dip-
lomatic and consular privileges and immunities. Such 
a specialized body is unique among the countries cov-
ered by the present study.
The Office of the Amiable Compositeur (OAC) 
was established in 1995 by the cantonal govern-
ment of Geneva in cooperation with the Swiss 
Mission to the United Nations (UN).76 It is fund-
ed by the canton of Geneva and has its secre-
tariat administratively attached to the latter. 
OAC has been set up as an independent and 
76  OAC was established at a time when widespread media coverage of cases of alleged abuse of domestic workers by diplomats and an 
increase in the international presence in Geneva caused concern on the part of the government about the city’s international image as 
well as the rights of private domestic workers. Geographically, OAC covers the canton of Geneva, seat of a large number of international 
organizations and UN Member States’ permanent missions to those, as well as neighboring canton of Vaud. An expansion to Berne 
where bilateral embassies are based is currently being discussed.
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impartial body that is not bound by any govern-
mental directives.77 The Office has three mem-
bers: a president who is also a Member of Par-
liament and a former Member of the cantonal 
government and her two deputies, former del-
egates of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross. OAC’s mediation services primarily 
focus on labor law disputes. Domestic workers 
reporting potential breaches of criminal law are 
provided with basic information on their rights 
and referred to specialized organizations for fur-
ther support and advice, such as the Geneva-
based NGO Cœur de Grottes. The Office also has 
a small hardship fund to provide financial sup-
port or loans to domestic workers. Its services 
are confidential and provided free of charge. 
Overall, an estimated 80 percent of OAC’s clients 
are employees, and the remaining 20 percent 
employers. The latter mostly contact OAC to 
request legal advice on issues such as the length 
of legal notification periods. Typically, disputes 
relate to payments of salaries, working condi-
tions and illegal dismissals. When it comes to 
finding an agreement on the amount to be paid, 
OAC has separate conversations with both par-
ties. In their work, they use two possibilities for 
coming up with a starting point in financial 
terms: either OAC makes a proposal to begin 
with that they regard appropriate or the media-
tion starts on the basis of the respective claims 
of the domestic worker and the employer.
Since its creation, OAC has been dealing with an 
average of 40-50 new cases per year.78 24 per-
cent (10 cases) out of the 41 cases effectively 
handled in 2009 could be resolved in that year 
as a result of OAC mediation and concluded by 
an agreement signed by both parties. A further 
four cases were resolved among parties them-
selves – not directly as a result from OAC’s medi-
ation but with some involvement at an earlier 
stage. Overall, the rate of successful mediations 
since OAC’s creation in 1995 is around 30-40 
percent.
In Belgium, the position of a Labor Mediator exists. 
However, it differs from OAC as it is not a specialized 
and independent body – the Mediator’s tasks are part 
of the portfolio of a Director General at the Federal 
Ministry of Labor. Furthermore, the Mediator’s main 
role in negotiations between diplomatic employers and 
private domestic workers is the calculation of employ-
ee’s claims. Upon request of the domestic workers or 
the Protocol department, the Labor Mediator provides 
exact calculations based on objective criteria, which 
are then used as basis for negotiations. Furthermore 
the body has the task to inform domestic workers on 
their rights. The Labor Mediator has so far played no 
direct role in negotiations facilitated by the Protocol 
department, but has done so in cases of mere labor 
law breaches (thus excluding those qualifying as traf-
ficking in human beings) referred to him by the NGO 
interviewed.
As regards the role of NGOs providing support to pri-
vate domestic workers, some of the organizations 
interviewed did participate in negotiations in order to 
safeguard the interests of their clients – either through 
joining negotiations facilitated by Protocol depart-
ments, if appropriate and apparently on an occasional 
rather than on a regular basis (as for example in Ger-
many), or through directly approaching diplomat 
employers or embassies (as was reported from Ireland 
and the United Kingdom). The French NGO interview-
ee stated that her organization did not directly par-
ticipate in negotiations but rather referred domestic 
worker to lawyers.
The lawyers interviewed had different levels of experi-
ence in representing private domestic workers 
employed by diplomats in negotiations – ranging from 
an exclusive focus on taking cases to court without 
any engagement in negotiations over some involve-
ment in negotiations, depending on the individual case 
either in addition to or instead of legal proceedings to 
a main focus on negotiations, after a few litigations 
at an earlier stage. According to NGOs and lawyers 
interviewed, the contact between domestic workers 
and lawyers is often facilitated by NGOs, many of them 
having established longstanding working relationships 
with lawyers from other areas of their work, such as 
77  See also Bureau de l’Amiable Compositeur 2008: Note à l’intention des Mesdames et Messieurs les députés membres de la Commission 
de droits de l’Homme du Grand Conseil genevois, 28 May 2008 (not published, on file with the author).
78  In 2009, OAC received a total of 62 requests, including 46 new cases. Out of these 62, 41 cases were effectively handled, besides 14 
that concerned preventive consultations and 5 requests that were not within the Office’s mandate. Out of the 41, 8 cases were closed 
without result and 19 were still ongoing by the end of 2009. These figures include both private domestic workers as well as service staff 
members (no breakdown of both categories available).
40
Research Findings4
supporting trafficked persons or domestic workers 
working with private employers. As state legal aid is 
either not available for extra-judicial negotiations or, 
if it exists (for example in Germany), fails to cover the 
entire costs incurred, the services of lawyers are most-
ly either paid by NGOs or provided by the lawyers on 
a pro bono basis.
Apart from Switzerland, where two unions based in 
Geneva were mentioned that are involved in advising 
and representing private domestic workers or referring 
them to lawyers, interview partners so far showed lim-
ited experience in working with trade unions in repre-
senting private domestic workers in court cases of 
negotiations against diplomatic employers. For exam-
ple the Irish NGO interview partner had referred to a 
case in which an Irish union had helped a driver 
employed at an embassy to realize his employment 
rights on the basis of a written agreement concluded 
with the embassy that had been facilitated by a union 
in the sending country. Apart from cooperation on indi-
vidual cases, NGO interviewees from Ireland and the 
United Kingdom had engaged with unions in the field 
of joint policy work and campaigning.
4.5.3 Outcomes of Negotiations
As regards the outcomes of negotiations between 
domestic workers and diplomats, in those cases that 
lead to a settlement, interviewees mainly pointed to 
financial settlements, but there was no indication of 
cases where the actual dispute was settled and an 
employment relationship reflecting legal rights and 
obligations continued.
In financial terms, a number of exemplary cases shared 
by interview partners from Germany and Austria for 
instance had resulted in settlements ranging from EUR 
1,200 up to around EUR 23,300. According to statistics 
provided by the representative of OAC in Switzerland,79 
the organization had facilitated settlements amount-
ing to CHF 89,874.45 (around EUR 69,200)80 in 2009. 
For the period of 1995-2009, the total amount of set-
tlements achieved was CHF 2,233,610.33 (around EUR 
1,719,500),81 with an annual average of CHF 148,907.36 
(or around EUR 114,600).82
The information obtained through interviews does not 
allow for representative conclusions on the extent to 
which the amounts agreed through negotiations reflect 
the amounts originally claimed. Interviews however 
reflected an overall tendency of monetary outcomes 
far below the original claim, often with discrepancies 
of about 50 percent. For example, in one case from 
Germany, the domestic worker had claimed EUR 31,000 
for unpaid wages, including overtime, over an employ-
ment period of 3 ½ years. Eventually, the settlement 
resulted in an award of EUR 16,000, based on the legal 
minimum wage, but without taking into consideration 
the overtime work performed, for which it was not 
possible to provide evidence. In one case reported by 
the Austrian Protocol department that involved phys-
ical violence, the employee claimed EUR 30,000, 
whereas the employer was willing to pay EUR 1,900 
covering one month’s salary and the worker’s return 
ticket – in that case, no settlement could be achieved. 
4.5.4 Assessment by Interview Partners
Interview findings reveal that the extra-judicial path 
has in several instances proven an - at least partly - 
effective route for domestic workers to obtain com-
pensatory payments owed to them under labor law. 
Indeed, a number of interview partners across all tar-
get groups found that out-of-court settlements implied 
a greater likelihood for domestic workers to obtain at 
least some remuneration compared to legal proceed-
ings, which would usually either be closed at some 
point because of the employer’s immunity from juris-
diction, or produce judgments that – even if they might 
in some cases award high amounts to the worker - 
could not be enforced, due to the diplomat’s immu-
nity from enforcement or because s/he had left the 
country. At the same time, a number of problems have 
been identified, as will be outlined in the present chap-
ter.
Outcomes of Negotiations
While the negotiation strategies of NGOs and lawyers 
rather aimed at obtaining payments that fully amount-
ed to the labor entitlements of domestic workers’ 
claims, state actors tended to pursue a rather prag-
matic approach. Accordingly, the assessment of the 
outcomes of out-of-court negotiations differed sub-
stantially among different groups of interview partners. 
79  Office of the Amiable Compositeur, Tableau comparatif 1995-2009, (not published, on file with the author). 
80  Calculation of the author, on the basis of ECB exchange rate as of 30 November 2010.
81  Ibid. 
82  Ibid. 
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NGO representatives and lawyers expressed concern 
about the low amounts negotiated by or on behalf of 
domestic workers, which were regarded as failing to 
reflect the workers’ entitlements under national law 
and the severity of rights violations experienced. Fur-
thermore, it was criticized that key elements of the 
workers entitlements, such as remuneration for over-
time work and unconsumed annual leave, or damages 
for harm and suffering, had been mostly absent from 
the negotiation table. As one NGO interviewee put it, 
“the outcome is usually a compromise which is obvi-
ously not in the interest of the victim”.
State representatives, on the other hand, tended to be 
rather satisfied with the outcomes of negotiations. 
Their objective seemed to be the achievement of a 
pragmatic compromise that was acceptable to both 
parties, even if it was far below the claims presented 
by domestic workers. In one country, concern was 
expressed about the amounts of claims presented by 
some domestic workers which were considered exces-
sive and therefore counterproductive. For example, as 
was explained by one interviewee, when a domestic 
worker demanded around EUR 92,000 for work per-
formed over a period of two or three years, such an 
amount was problematic because it was clearly not 
affordable to the employer and therefore reduced the 
chance for a successful settlement. As a thumb rule, 
the interviewee regarded reasonable an amount that 
was between the legal minimum wage and what was 
acceptable to each party - which would usually be 
around two-thirds of the minimum wage. Overall it 
was argued that it was important that in the end the 
employer or embassy was able to pay the amount nego-
tiated, even if it was less than the original claim – only 
then the domestic worker could be certain to receive 
the money.
Difficulties in Providing Evidence to Substantiate 
Claims
As a general rule, due to the absence of witnesses, it 
is difficult for domestic workers to prove labor rights 
violations committed in the hidden sphere of the home, 
in particular unpaid wages and excessive work hours, 
which often constitute the biggest part of their claims. 
Furthermore, cases have been reported where domes-
tic workers were coerced or deceived to provide blank 
signatures or had to sign papers which they did not 
understand, which were then used by employers to 
wrongly claim that payments had been made. Only in 
isolated instances have domestic workers been able to 
prove overtime with the help of witnesses, usually as 
result of contacts to the outside world, for example 
when neighbors could confirm that they had seen the 
domestic worker looking after the diplomat’s children 
at the playground every weekend. Overall, the situa-
tion of proof in practice works in favor of the more 
powerful party.
Settings of Negotiations and Actors Involved
While the participation of Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs in facilitating negotiations was overall assessed 
positively, non-state actors pointed to cases where the 
role of the Ministries as custodian of diplomatic rela-
tions had conflicted with their function as complaint 
mechanism or facilitator of settlements. The Ministries’ 
neutrality was sometimes questioned.
Some NGOs underlined the important role that Proto-
col departments have played in setting the stage for 
negotiations between domestic workers and their rep-
resentatives on the one hand and the diplomats and/
or embassies on the other and pointed to the impor-
tance of developing good working contacts with Pro-
tocol officers. As stated by one NGO, “the diplomats 
wouldn’t be willing to talk to us or to the lawyer if the 
Foreign Ministry was not involved in the discussion.” 
Furthermore, negotiations facilitated through the Min-
istry rather than the NGO getting in direct contact with 
the employer was regarded useful as it allowed for 
official confirmation or regularization of the domestic 
worker’s residence status.
NGOs attached great importance to the background 
and commitment of the head of Protocol department 
and the level of sensitivity and competency of Protocol 
staff to address cases of rights violations reported by 
domestic workers. Understanding of issues around vic-
timization was regarded crucial, given the fact that 
domestic workers sometimes feared repercussions from 
their employers and that it therefore might take quite 
some time for them to speak out on the rights viola-
tions and trauma experienced. The point on sensitivity 
was also linked to staff turnover as new officials might 
be less aware of the issue and therefore at first be 
hesitant to take a strong stand vis-à-vis abusive 
employers so that good work relationships have to be 
built again.
Non-state interviewees considered problematic that 
the impact of the role of Foreign Ministries as guard-
ian of diplomatic relations depended on a number of 
factors, including the sending country of the employ-
er, the host country’s economic interests, or the status 
of the employer: if s/he was the ambassador, the pro-
cess might take longer as the Foreign Ministry might 
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be more keen to avoid diplomatic problems, whereas 
in case of a diplomat, the Ministry could seek to exert 
pressure on the ambassador in order for her/him to 
insist that the diplomat settled the case.
NGOs tended to regard their own participation in nego-
tiations important in order to ensure that their clients’ 
interests were appropriately represented vis-à-vis the 
Protocol department and the employer. Furthermore, 
it was considered to contribute to increased transpar-
ency of the process – also because the Foreign Minis-
try in its role as neutral convenor was not seen in an 
appropriate position to exert pressure on diplomats 
and to take sides.
Among Foreign Ministry interviewees, there were dif-
ferent views on the role of NGOs in negotiations facil-
itated by the Ministries. One Ministry interviewee 
regarded the psycho-social skills of specialized NGOs 
as valuable to support the domestic worker, as Proto-
col staff lacked specific expertise in this area. It was 
suggested that NGOs participating in negotiations 
might benefit from increased legal expertise, either 
through own staff capacities or external support from 
a lawyer. Another Foreign Ministry interviewee from a 
country where regular contact between the Protocol 
department and an NGO was established explained 
that while in principle nothing spoke against the pres-
ence of NGOs in negotiations, they had no specific role 
in the negotiations facilitated by the Ministry. In 
another country, where no contact in regard to indi-
vidual cases or policy consultations was in place 
between the Foreign Ministry and NGOs, the Ministry 
interviewee tended to perceive the role of NGOs rath-
er as service providers than as relevant actors in the 
negotiation process.
In Switzerland, where an external mechanism specif-
ically devoted to mediating disputes between diplo-
mats and private domestic workers – the Office of the 
Amiable Compositeur (OAC) - exists, interview partners 
overall appreciated the establishment of this institu-
tion. Positive attributes included the external nature 
of the Office and that its establishment demonstrated 
political will on part of the government to tackle the 
issue. All interview partners underlined the importance 
of impartiality and independence of such a mechanism. 
While representatives from the Foreign Ministry and 
OAC regarded the Office sufficiently independent and 
underlined its equidistance to both parties, concern 
was voiced among non-state interview partners that 
because of its staffing,83 OAC was positioned too close 
to the government which gave reason to doubt its 
independence. Furthermore, the Office was perceived 
as leaning rather towards the employers’ side, which 
was found to have a negative impact on the outcomes 
of negotiations.
The participation of lawyers representing domestic 
workers in negotiations was deemed useful by several 
interviewees because of their legal expertise supple-
menting the psycho-social skills of NGOs, for instance 
when it came to calculating claims. Furthermore, sup-
port by a lawyer could help to give stronger weight to 
a case vis-à-vis the Protocol department, compared 
for instance to a letter merely signed by a NGO. A major 
challenge identified was funding. Even if state-funded 
legal aid existed, it was available only for court pro-
ceedings. NGOs in countries without pro-bono tradi-
tion could not always afford to pay for a lawyer to 
represent their clients in negotiations.
When it comes to the role of trade unions, NGOs tend-
ed to see an added value of partnerships rather in joint 
policy work and campaigning, than in the field of indi-
vidual case work. That was explained by the fact that 
domestic workers in general, and those employed by 
diplomats in particular, have traditionally not been 
among the core target groups of unions. Also it was 
explained that unions usually provided services only to 
those workers who have been paying members for a 
certain period of time, which was often not the case 
for private domestics working for diplomats.
As regards the role of domestic workers in negotia-
tions, several interviewees regarded their participation 
at the negotiation table important, as it enabled them 
to voice their views and interests. At the same time, it 
was stated that the workers were sometimes too mod-
est and too readily accepting offers that were far below 
their entitlements – possibly because of fear of the 
employer, but also because an amount of for instance 
EUR 400 that was below the legal minimum wage was 
often still a lot of money compared to earnings back 
home. This was a challenge for NGOs whose work was 
guided by their clients’ interests: if the worker accept-
ed an offer that the NGO regarded not sufficient, there 
was no way to prevent the client from doing so. Some-
times negotiations were attended by NGOs without 
presence of their clients, in order to be able to negoti-
83  The President of OAC is a former government minister and current member of Parliament. Her two deputies are former delegates of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.
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ate a settlement that reflected the worker’s legal enti-
tlements. According to a Foreign Ministry representa-
tive, domestic workers needed to be convinced to insist 
on their rights - that was where well-experienced 
NGOs would bring an added value.
Factors Influencing the Outcomes of Negotiations
A number of ingredients for successful negotiations 
were identified by interviewees. Some of these factors 
were regarded useful to achieve a better balance in 
the unequal power relationship between employers 
and employees. Others could help to increase the 
understanding on the part of actors involved in facili-
tating negotiations as well as the willingness of par-
ties to come to a settlement.
According to some representatives of Foreign Minis-
tries, the withdrawal of privileges such as unilateral 
tax exemptions or the refusal or delay of the registra-
tion of new domestic workers had in some cases had 
the positive effect of increasing the willingness of dip-
lomats to engage in negotiations and pay the amounts 
agreed.
Several interview partners among state and non-state 
actors pointed to the importance of reputation to the 
employer and her/his embassy. It was underlined that 
facilitators needed to understand the needs of the par-
ties and what would be the worst case scenario for 
either side: As a rule, the strongest interest of employ-
ers and their embassies was to avoid damage to their 
reputation, while employees were greatly interested in 
obtaining financial compensation for and moral rec-
ognition of their entitlements by their (former) employ-
er. Mainly non-state actors have identified media cov-
erage and public campaigning to make abusive behav-
iour of diplomat employers widely visible (“naming and 
shaming”) as a useful tool to enable their clients to 
obtain remuneration. The fear of loss of reputation was 
seen as major factor to motivate diplomats to engage 
in negotiations and to pay an appropriate amount to 
domestic workers, as well as embassies to put pressure 
on and take responsibility for their staff members who 
employ domestic workers under exploitative condi-
tions. As one NGO interviewee put it: “The only pres-
sure we have is to go public.” Recent examples taken 
to the public by NGOs and accompanied by widespread 
media coverage include the cases of “Ms Hasniati”, a 
client of the German NGO Ban Ying; and of Valentyna 
Khristonsen, a domestic worker supported by the Irish 
NGO MRCI. Both organizations found that the public 
naming and shaming of abusive employers had proven 
useful to obtain settlements for their clients and said 
that they would be using this strategy also in other 
cases.
In November 2009, MRCI’s Domestic Workers 
Action Group organized a public protest of over 
40 of its members in front of the private resi-
dence of the former employer of Valentyna 
Khristonsen, a domestic worker from Ukraine.84 
That was at a time when Ms Khristonsen’s com-
plaint was pending before the Labor Rights Com-
mission because of multiple breaches of her 
labor rights, whereas the employer, an Ambas-
sador, had claimed exemption from jurisdiction 
because of diplomatic immunity. Eventually, the 
Commission accepted the employer’s claim and 
refused to deal with the case. Subsequently, 
MRCI supported its client in appealing this deci-
sion before the Labor Court. While the case was 
still pending in court, it was eventually settled 
through out-of-court negotiations in November 
2010. Due to a confidentiality agreement, no 
further details were available from the NGO on 
the outcome of the negotiations, except that 
“the case has been satisfactorily concluded and 
Valentyna is happy.”
In the case of “Ms Hasniati”, negotiations 
between the NGO Ban Ying and the embassy of 
the diplomat’s sending state had been going on 
for one year. At some point, when no agreement 
could be achieved, Ban Ying set a deadline, and 
after it had passed decided to make the case 
public.85 As a result of media coverage and pub-
lic pressure, the embassy – not the employer 
himself – eventually paid “Ms Hasniati” com-
pensation in the amount of EUR 23,250 – as 
84  For examples of media coverage, see The Irish Times 2009: Protest over ambassador’s immunity claim in employments rights dispute. 
5 November 2009; Irish Examiner 2009: Protest over ambassador’s immunity claim in worker case. 5 November 2009; Evening Herald: 
Diplomat claims immunity in row with housekeeper. 5 November 2009.
85  For examples of media coverage, see Der Spiegel 2008: Mitten in Berlin: Diplomat hält Angestellte wie Sklavin 26 January 2008. 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,530836,00.html (visited 25 May 2011); die tageszeitung 2008: Ausbeutung bei 
Diplomaten in Berlin: Botschaft entschädigt Sklavin. 30 January 2008. http://www.taz.de/1/politik/deutschland/artikel/1/botschaft-
entschaedigt-sklavin/ (visited 25 May 2011).
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opposed to the embassy’s original offer of EUR 
5,000. The case was closed with a press declara-
tion publicizing the settlement achieved.
When using public pressure, interviewees also identi-
fied a number of limitations: Journalists were often 
interested only in covering cases that involved extreme 
rights violations, and wanted to name the embassy 
and/or the diplomat concerned – the latter was not 
possible for domestic workers who feared the diplo-
mat’s power and repercussions for their families back 
home. Furthermore, settlements that came along with 
confidentiality agreements between the embassy and 
the NGO could be problematic. On the one hand, sign-
ing such an agreement was often necessary to achieve 
the consent of the diplomat or embassy to pay. On the 
other, NGOs faced a dilemma as they did have an inter-
est in supporting their clients to obtain a settlement, 
but also in exposing human rights violations experi-
enced by domestic workers. As one NGO representative 
put it, “they basically buy our silence”.
Another important element identified was to under-
stand the differences between legal systems of send-
ing countries and host countries, which required for 
example to explain employers coming from countries 
with lower levels of labor law protection the rationale 
behind legal minimum wages or limited work hours as 
established by the host country’s laws. 
Some Foreign Ministry interviewees underlined the 
importance of understanding the “human element”: 
a lot depended on the chemistry between the persons 
involved in negotiations and the willingness of both 
parties to come together and find an agreement. That 
was considered particularly true for domestic work 
relationships, which were based on much closer inter-
personal relations than other areas of work. In some 
cases, the working conditions had been so severe that 
the parties were not willing to talk to each other any-
more – a situation posing challenges for Protocol staff 
when seeking to facilitate a settlement, as they were 
not specialized in psycho-social matters and not used 
to handle such emotional situations. 
As another important factor, the mediator’s credibil-
ity and neutrality was underlined. Especially when 
dealing with ambassadors who are used to operate in 
hierarchies it was considered crucial that the negotia-
tions were facilitated by a “respectable” person and 
trustworthy organization.
The following example summarizes some of the key 
challenges inherent to out-of-court negotiations iden-
tified by the interview partners. It demonstrates the 
divergent objectives of the different parties involved 
in negotiations – finding a solution that contributes 
to a good diplomatic atmosphere versus fully satisfy-
ing the domestic worker’s legal entitlements. It also 
underlines the importance of institutionalized and 
transparent procedures and the need to inform domes-
tic workers about her/his legal entitlements and to 
empower them with a view to encouraging them to 
claim their rights.
The host country’s Protocol department had 
received information from the police about a 
private domestic worker who had, while staying 
abroad with her employer, left a note in a hotel 
in which she called for help. After the Protocol 
department invited the worker for a meeting for 
which she did not show up, they contacted the 
ambassador of the diplomat’s embassy to raise 
the matter. A few months later it turned out that 
the worker had left her employer and turned to 
her country’s embassy where she received 
accommodation. The negotiations, in which 
three ambassadors - from the Protocol depart-
ment and the embassies of the employer’s send-
ing state and the domestic worker’s country of 
origin, respectively – got engaged, resulted in 
compensation to the domestic worker for unpaid 
wages for a period of 2-3 months and a flight 
ticket back home. The Protocol interviewee 
regarded this case as success, because everybody 
involved – the domestic worker as well as the 
ambassadors – was happy with the outcome. The 
direct and good communication among the three 
ambassadors, who demonstrated commitment 
and awareness of the problem, had played a key 
role. From the perspective of the NGO, which had 
not been present in the negotiations, the final 
amount paid – EUR 2,000, while the minimum 
wage alone would have amounted to at least 
EUR 5,000 – did not correspond to the worker’s 
entitlements under labor law and failed to 
include damages for pain and suffering.
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4.6 The Role of the International Human 
Rights Framework
Addressing rights violations experienced by private 
domestic workers at the level of international human 
rights mechanisms has been identified by non-state 
interview partners as a significant strategy, given the 
limitations in obtaining access to justice at the level 
of national legal systems set by the parameters of dip-
lomatic immunity.
This chapter maps efforts of NGO interview partners 
to use the international human rights framework in 
their efforts to strengthen the access of private domes-
tic workers to justice, at both the level of individual 
cases and the policy level.
4.6.1 Individual Complaints to the European 
Court of Human Rights and United Nations 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies
The European Court of Human Rights and several UN 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies enable individuals to sub-
mit individual claims against states for violations of 
rights guaranteed by human rights conventions.
So far, none of the NGO interview partners has sub-
mitted an individual complaint to international human 
rights bodies in order to challenge the specific gaps 
and obstacles faced by private domestic workers work-
ing in diplomats’ households in seeking access to jus-
tice for rights violations.
In 2001, the Committee against Modern Slavery 
(CCEM) submitted a complaint involving a case of 
domestic servitude to the European Court of Human 
Rights that resulted in a condemnation of France by 
the Court for a violation of Article 4 ECHR prohibiting 
forced labor and servitude (judgment Siliadin versus 
France).86 While that case did not involve a diplomat-
ic employer, it exemplifies, according to the French 
NGO interviewee, the failure of the criminal justice 
system to recognize forced labor in domestic work as 
a serious offence and to provide the complainants with 
effective protection under criminal law – one of the 
systematic obstacles that also affect the access to jus-
tice of private domestic workers employed by diplomats.
Several NGO representatives and one of the lawyers 
interviewed underlined the potential of the Court’s 
recent judgment in the case of Cudak against Lithu-
ania.87
The Court dealt with a complaint involving unfair 
dismissal of an employee of the Polish embassy 
in Lithuania who had been sexually harassed by 
a colleague. It found that Lithuania, by having 
accepted the Polish government’s argument that 
state immunity applied and exempted it from 
Lithuania’s jurisdiction had violated the appli-
cant’s right to access to court (Article 6 ECHR). 
While this case concerned state immunity and 
not diplomatic immunity, some interviewees 
underlined the importance of the Court’s argu-
ment in which it referred to the evolving nature 
of international law and differentiated between 
acts of a public-law nature (acta iure imperii) 
and of a private law nature (acta iure gestionis), 
exempting the latter from state immunity.
Another channel for seeking redress in individual cas-
es of human rights violations is the UN system, through 
its system of human rights treaty bodies and their pow-
er to receive individual complaints. Possible avenues 
include the UN Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW – 
Article 6: elimination of trafficking in women; Article 
11: elimination of discrimination against women in the 
field of employment ), the UN International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR – Article 2 para-
graph 3 b: access to justice; Article 8: prohibition of 
slavery, servitude and forced labor) and the UN Inter-
national Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICE-
SCR – Article 7: right to just and fair working condi-
tions; Article 6: right to work). While CEDAW and CCPR 
foresee the right to submit individual complaints to 
the respective Committees in charge of monitoring of 
the treaties’ implementation,88 that procedure is not 
yet available under the CESCR as the Optional Protocol 
establishing the individual complaint procedure adopt-
ed in 2008 has not yet entered into force. So far, no 
individual complaint has been brought by interviewees 
to a UN human rights treaty body.
86  European Court of Human Rights 2005: Case of Siliadin v. France, Application no. 73316/01, judgment of 26 July 2005.
87  European Court of Human Rights 2010: Case of Cudak v. Lithuania, Application no. 15869/02, judgment of 23 March 2010.
88  An individual complaint can be brought against those states that have ratified both the treaty and the respective Optional Protocols 
accompanying the treaty.
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4.6.2 Inquiry Procedures before United Nations 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies
Several UN human rights foresee inquiry procedures 
undertaken by the respective expert committees 
responsible for monitoring the treaties’ implementa-
tion, in order to investigate systematic or grave human 
rights violations.
One NGO interviewed for this study, Ban Ying, in 2003 
turned to the UN CEDAW Committee and requested 
the initiation of an inquiry into the exploitation of pri-
vate domestic workers employed by diplomats in Ger-
many, in order to challenge the German government’s 
response to rights violations experienced by the work-
ers at the hands of their employers. The input to the 
Committee89 has built on experiences from ten cases 
occurred over a period of three years that have been 
compiled by Ban Ying through a survey among German 
NGOs providing support to trafficked women.
While the request did not result in an opening of an 
inquiry by the CEDAW Committee, according to Ban 
Ying, the publicity created by this step alerted the gov-
ernment and led to a number of structural changes to 
the existing policy framework governing the employ-
ment of private domestic workers employed by diplo-
mats. In particular, in 2004 the German Foreign Min-
istry introduced a minimum wage for this group of 
workers at the amount of 750 EUR per month, plus 
accommodation, food and health insurance.
4.6.3 Inputs to State Reporting to United 
Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and other 
Human Rights Monitoring Processes
Among the existing international human rights mech-
anisms, NGO interview partners had gained the most 
experience with human rights monitoring procedures, 
such as state reporting to UN human rights treaty bod-
ies or the work of UN Special Rapporteurs procedures. 
Several NGOs have used these procedures as a forum 
to present their concerns and recommendations.
For example, the exploitation of private domestic work-
ers employed by diplomats was brought up in NGO 
shadow reports under CESCR (Germany90 and Bel-
gium91) or in submissions to the Committee on Migrant 
Workers.92 In the United Kingdom, NGOs submitted 
inputs to the UN Special Rapporteurs on the Human 
Rights of Migrants93 and on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery,94 respectively. Indeed, the report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants to the 
Human Rights Council on his country visit to the Unit-
ed Kingdom published in March 2010 reflected some 
of the concerns and recommendations stated by the 
NGO in its submission. That included a point on the 
specific vulnerability to abuse of private domestic 
workers coming to the United Kingdom to accompany 
diplomats, as opposed to those working for private 
persons, accompanied by a recommendation to ensure 
that the first group enjoys the same level of protection 
as the latter, in particular the right to switch employ-
ers.95
Another channel identified was submitting NGO shad-
ow reports to the Group of Experts on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), the expert body 
tasked with the monitoring of the implementation of 
the CoE Convention against Trafficking in Human 
Beings, given the fact that it was still relatively new 
and in the process of shaping its thematic priorities.
While inputs to international human rights monitoring 
processes were regarded as a strategic opportunity to 
voice concerns and influence policy directions, concern 
was also raised about limited resources available to 
NGOs on top of high loads of case work and about the 
difficulties to see how such policy recommendations 
would translate into real impact on the rights of 
domestic workers.
89  Ban Ying 2003.
90  Alliance for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Germany (WSK Allianz) 2010: p. 55.
91  Coalition of Belgian Civil Society for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2005.
92  Monitoring body of the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.
93  Kalayaan and Anti-Slavery International 2009.
94  Kalayaan 2010b.
95  Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants 2010: paragraphs 62 and 76 (a).
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5  
Conclusions and Recommendations
The present study documents examples of rights vio-
lations experienced by domestic workers working in 
private households of diplomats in select host coun-
tries. It analyses legal and institutional responses and 
their application vis-à-vis bearers of diplomatic immu-
nity in select European countries. In order to be able 
to develop recommendations that aim to achieve a 
balance between the maintenance of diplomatic rela-
tions and the enforcement of individual rights state 
and non-state actors have been interviewed.
The following recommendations, unless stated other-
wise, are addressed to state and non-state actors in 
host countries. While the proposed measures are based 
on the experiences and practices in the countries cov-
ered by the present research, they aim to provide a 
framework for reform in other countries as well.
5.1 General Observations
The issue of severe rights violations experienced by 
private domestic workers employed by diplomats as 
well as the gaps and challenges these workers face in 
accessing justice has increasingly emerged on the 
international agenda - not least due to sustained and 
concerted advocacy and awareness raising efforts by 
NGOs.
On a positive note, a number of current developments 
in the countries covered by this study indicate grow-
ing awareness on the part of governments of the issue 
and provide opportunities to strengthen the protection 
of private domestic workers’ rights. This includes the 
new requirement of opening a bank account for sal-
ary payments to domestic workers in Austria or an 
upcoming review of the visa scheme for migrant 
domestic workers, including those working in diplo-
mats’ households, in the United Kingdom. Another 
example is the pending adoption of a new Ordinance 
harmonizing the working conditions for private domes-
tic workers employed by diplomats in Switzerland at 
the federal level, which will, among others, introduce 
a federal minimum wage and more regular meetings 
with domestic workers to follow up on reported rights 
violations. At the same time, severe systemic short-
comings persist. While some cases have been docu-
mented where domestic workers working for diplomats 
have been able to realize their entitlements vis-à-vis 
their former employers, these examples are based on 
case-by-case or informal approaches rather than on a 
systematic approach or even legal certainty. 
On the one hand, it is generally recognized that dip-
lomatic immunity serves the legitimate purpose to pro-
tect individual diplomats from arbitrary interference 
with their work, so as to ensure the effective function-
ing of their sending state’s diplomatic relations. On the 
other hand, it has become apparent that individual 
diplomats have been abusing their immunity to shield 
themselves from being held accountable for serious 
rights violations committed. From the perspective of 
private domestic workers, this de facto impunity 
enjoyed by their employers, together with the hidden 
nature of domestic work and their marginalization as 
migrant workers puts them at risk of exploitation and 
abuse, while preventing their access to justice and 
compensation as well as remuneration.
Official figures of private domestic workers registered 
with Foreign Ministries do not necessarily encompass 
all persons who work for diplomats in the countries 
covered, but only those who are migrant workers and 
possess a special ID card96 issued by Protocol depart-
ments to work in the host country. Workers that might 
have been recruited at the local labor market who pos-
96  Private domestic workers employed by diplomats are provided with special ID cards from Protocol departments which serve as 
confirmation of their residence status in the host country.
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sess the nationality of the host country, a different 
residence status or no regular status or workers who 
are declared as family members of the diplomat are 
not included. Consequently, figures on rights violations 
provided by Foreign Ministries also include only those 
workers who have been officially registered with Pro-
tocol departments.
Research undertaken for this study revealed that pre-
cise and comparable figures on cases of alleged rights 
violations committed by diplomats vis-à-vis their 
domestic staff and the number and nature of legal 
proceedings are not available because they are not 
compiled systematically by Protocol departments and 
most NGOs; information can be provided only on an 
anecdotal basis. Figures provided by Foreign Ministries 
and the Geneva-based Office of the Amiable Compos-
iteur ranged from one case in one year up to 62 cases 
in one year. Based on the findings of the interviews, it 
can be assumed that in countries where a formalized 
way for domestic worker to report rights violations to 
Protocol departments exists, the number of reports of 
alleged rights violations is higher than in other coun-
tries.
As regards the qualitative dimension, interviewees 
pointed at a large share of labor rights violations in 
various degrees among the cases they had come across. 
On one end of the spectrum, they listed breaches of 
labor law such as failure on the part of the employer 
to pay the full wage or fully compensate the worker 
for extra hours. Examples of more severe violations 
include complete withholding of wages, forcing work-
ers to work excessive 16-18 hours without days off 
and without any or with inadequate compensation, or 
failure to provide them with adequate accommodation 
and food. On the other end of the spectrum, some of 
the cases amounted to slavery-like conditions when 
additionally the workers’ freedom of movement was 
restricted, notably by prohibiting them to have social 
contacts and to leave the house unaccompanied. The 
main focus of the examples given was on cases of 
severe breaches of labor law.
5.2 Cooperation and Support Services
In supporting the access of private domestic workers 
to justice, cooperation between Protocol departments 
and NGOs constitutes an added value. This fact has 
been underlined in those countries where such coop-
eration is in place. It seems that in countries where 
institutionalized multi-stakeholder cooperation as part 
of anti-trafficking National Referral Mechanisms 
exists, more established cooperation and support struc-
tures tend to be in place in the context of domestic 
workers exploited by diplomats. At the same time, the 
circle of relevant NGOs is not limited to those working 
on anti-trafficking, but also includes migrants’ rights 
or domestic workers’ rights organizations. Due to their 
specific thematic focus, these organizations not only 
possess valuable expertise but also are able to reach 
out to private domestic workers who might not be cli-
ents of anti-trafficking NGOs.
Existing anti-trafficking support infrastructure can 
offer private domestic workers access to specialized 
support, protection and residence status. While this is 
an important starting point, it is not sufficient, given 
the fact that not all cases of exploitation of domestic 
workers amount to or are identified as human traffick-
ing. Furthermore, the identification as presumed traf-
ficked persons and the obtaining of a residence status 
often requires the cooperation of trafficked persons in 
legal proceedings against the trafficker, which is usu-
ally not an option for private domestic workers employed 
by diplomats, given the latter’s immunity from juris-
diction. Therefore, a more comprehensive approach is 
needed to ensure that all domestic workers who have 
experienced rights violations by employers with diplo-
matic status can access support services - whether or 
not they have been trafficked or have been identified 
as presumed trafficked persons.
Recommendations:
n Governments, in consultation and cooperation 
with relevant NGOs, should ensure that domestic 
workers who experienced rights violations by 
diplomat employers have access to support and 
counseling services, irrespective of whether they 
have been trafficked or identified as presumed 
trafficked persons.
n Protocol departments, in engaging in dialog and 
cooperation with NGOs, for example around policy 
dialog or referrals of private domestic workers to 
support services, should include a broad range of 
relevant NGOs, including those working on anti-
trafficking, migrants’ rights and domestic workers’ 
rights.
n Protocol departments and NGOs dealing with 
domestic workers employed by diplomats should 
jointly review the implementation of existing 
procedures to regulate the admission of domestic 
workers and the monitoring of employment 
relationships. This could be done through annual 
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meetings. In order to be able to maintain and 
improve the results continuously, meetings 
should be institutionalized. In doing so, Protocol 
departments and NGOs should build on and 
integrate lessons learned from existing cooperation 
structures within National Referral Mechanisms to 
assist and protect trafficked persons.
5.3 Admission and Monitoring  
Procedures - Regulating the Entry and 
Employment of Domestic Workers
Foreign Ministries in host countries have put a number 
of legal and institutional measures in place to regulate 
the entering and registration of private domestic work-
ers employed by diplomats and, to varying extents, to 
monitor ongoing employment relationships. Registra-
tion procedures, including the provision of special Pro-
tocol ID cards, enable Protocol officials to check 
whether employment contracts reflect certain stand-
ards, such as minimum wages, working hours or suit-
able accommodation. Model contracts that are in line 
with national labor law and international labor rights 
standards and that are to be used by diplomat employ-
ers on a mandatory basis are useful in this respect. 
However, the privacy of the home in general and the 
inviolability of the diplomat’s residence in particular 
impede the monitoring of whether these standards are 
met in practice.
Admission criteria, such as the requirement for domes-
tic workers to be unmarried, to live in the same house-
hold with the employer and the lack of possibilities to 
bring their family members to their host country are 
problematic with a view to the workers’ right to pri-
vacy and family life as well as the principle of non-
discrimination. They also increase their exposure to 
isolation, exploitation and abuse. Positive examples in 
this regard are Belgium and France, where domestic 
workers may bring their family members. Even where 
domestic workers are theoretically not obliged to live 
in their employer’s house, such as in Austria, Belgium 
and France, their chances to rent external accommo-
dation are limited by the fact that this would involve 
additional costs which domestic workers are often not 
able to cover when they earn salaries not exceeding 
the level of national minimum wages.
Innovative measures include the requirement of 
domestic workers to pick up their ID card in person 
from the Protocol department, which not only enables 
them to keep control over their personal documents 
but also to seek information on their legal rights and 
report problems with their employers. Encouraging 
experiences in this regard have been shared by inter-
view partners from several countries, including Austria 
and Belgium. In the latter country, the personal con-
tact of the Protocol department with domestic work-
ers was reported to have resulted in an increase in 
reports of rights violations. In one country, the possi-
bility of domestic workers to meet with NGO staff spe-
cialized in psycho-social support in the Ministry has 
been positively assessed by both Protocol department 
and NGO representatives involved. Furthermore, the 
mandatory opening of bank accounts for the payment 
of salaries to domestic workers, as has been introduced 
recently in Austria, can help domestic workers to 
increase control over their earnings and makes money 
flows transparent, thereby helping both parties when 
it comes to proving the payment or non-payment of 
wages.
Access of domestic workers to comprehensible infor-
mation about their legal rights and possibilities to seek 
support in a language they understand is a key pre-
requisite for their access to justice. In this respect, the 
comprehensive brochure for domestic workers pub-
lished by the Swiss Foreign Ministry in eight languag-
es and the compilation of Protocol verbal notes and 
circulars published and distributed by the German NGO 
Ban Ying are examples worth mentioning. The study 
has also revealed the need to inform foreign diplomats 
of their rights and, in particular, obligations under the 
host country’s labor laws, in particular for those com-
ing from countries with lower levels of labor law pro-
tection than the respective host country.
Recommendations:
n Protocol departments should require domestic 
workers to pick up their Protocol IDs in person 
at the stages of first registration and renewal to 
enable them to access information and report 
problems with their employers. At these meetings 
that should be held in the absence of the 
employer, Protocol departments should provide 
domestic workers with information on their rights 
and contact details of specialized NGOs who can 
provide advice and support. Such information has 
to be in writing and in a language the domestic 
worker understands.
n Protocol departments and NGOs should jointly 
develop objective indicators to determine the 
circumstances under which follow-up meetings 
with domestic workers have to be set up (for 
example, when a domestic worker reports problems 
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at the occasion of picking up a renewed Protocol 
ID or when the Protocol department receives such 
information from a NGO).
n Protocol departments should create an enabling 
environment to encourage domestic workers to 
report problems with their employers, including 
through sensitizing Protocol staff in contact with 
domestic workers, referring workers claiming 
abuse to support services including specialized 
NGOs and helping domestic workers to get in 
touch with such organizations if they wish, for 
example through inviting NGOs to meet with 
domestic workers at the Ministry.
n Protocol departments should systematically docu-
ment severe rights violations, in order to prevent 
the hiring of further domestic workers by diplomats 
with negative track records as long as compensation 
and remuneration has not been paid.
n Protocol departments should inform both employers 
and domestic workers on their rights and obligations 
under the host country’s laws through appropriate 
means, including through publishing and distributing 
written materials.
n Protocol departments should require the opening 
and use of bank accounts for payment of wages 
to domestic workers, and, upon reports of alleged 
labor rights violations, require employers to 
provide account statements to prove payments. 
n Protocol departments should review existing 
admission criteria for the employment of private 
domestic workers and remove those unduly 
interfering with the workers’ right to privacy, 
family life and the principle of equal treatment, in 
particular through allowing workers to bring close 
family members and removing the obligations of 
the employee to live in their employer’s household. 
n Governments should develop a model to enable 
domestic workers to access separate accommodation 
in a way that is affordable for both parties, diplomat 
employers and domestic workers.
5.4 Immigration Status of the Domestic 
Worker
The residence status of domestic workers is accessory 
to the continuation of the employment relationship 
and the diplomat’s stay in the host country. That 
implies that, once employment has ended, the domes-
tic worker loses her/his right to stay and work on the 
host state’s territory. Furthermore, domestic workers 
are, apart from limited exceptions, not allowed to 
switch their employers. These restrictions prevent 
workers from leaving abusive work conditions, thereby 
perpetuating situations of dependency and rights vio-
lations and impeding their access to redress. 
In some countries private domestic workers are allowed 
to switch within the diplomatic community. While this 
option certainly offers an exit route from abuse and 
alternative income opportunities, it fails to address the 
problem of continuous dependency on the employers, 
resulting from the latter’s diplomatic status which 
shields them from state monitoring of their employees’ 
working conditions and from being held accountable 
for rights violations committed.
As a general rule, holders of special Protocol IDs are 
not eligible to apply for residence permits under the 
host countries’ immigration laws. In some countries, 
domestic workers are in theory able to switch from 
Protocol IDs to regular residence permits, but only if 
they fulfill the general requirements under national 
immigration legislation, such as appropriate accom-
modation, health insurance or educational qualifica-
tions. Furthermore, exceptional instances have been 
reported where domestic workers could regularize their 
status in the course of regularization and naturaliza-
tion campaigns or in the framework of specific resi-
dence permits for trafficked persons. In general, there 
was little information available as to exact modalities 
and requirements and numbers of domestic workers 
who had been able to change their status. 
Residence permits under anti-trafficking regulations 
were considered especially by Foreign Ministry repre-
sentatives as a viable option for domestic workers 
exploited by diplomats to obtain support and regular-
ize their residence status. However, it emerged from 
interviews that the potential of such permits to ben-
efit domestic workers employed by diplomats is lim-
51
Conclusions and Recommendations 5
ited: Only a small number of domestic workers expe-
riencing rights violations qualify or are identified as 
trafficked persons. Furthermore, the nexus of these 
residence permits with criminal proceedings and/or 
with the cooperation of trafficked persons with law 
enforcement poses particular challenges for employees 
of diplomats as the immunity enjoyed by the latter 
implies that investigations are discontinued or not even 
started. In this regard, the Belgian regulation provides 
a noteworthy example. It enables trafficked persons to 
obtain residence permits on the basis of a favorable 
opinion of the prosecutor, in cases where diplomatic 
immunity of the accused prevents the case from being 
taken to court.
Recommendations:
n Protocol departments should review, in light of 
the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the case of Rantsev against Cyprus and 
Russia and the positive obligations under Art. 4 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights, the 
tying of a residence status of domestic workers 
to their diplomatic employers, especially in 
combination with the requirement to live in the 
employers’ household and the informal character 
of domestic work.
n Protocol departments should, as a minimum stand-
ard, allow domestic workers to switch employers 
within the diplomatic community and provide 
them with an appropriate time period to find a new 
employer.
n Governments should provide domestic workers 
employed by diplomats with the same possibilities 
to switch to other residence and work permits as 
domestic workers employed by non-diplomats.  
n In case of prima facie evidence of rights violations, 
Governments should enable a domestic worker to 
stay in the host country as long as necessary to 
settle their claims under labor law through judicial 
proceedings or extra-judicial negotiations and to 
obtain medical treatment, if needed.
n Protocol departments and all other actors in the 
host countries in contact with domestic workers 
should refer workers who are identified as 
presumed trafficked persons to National Referral 
Mechanisms to enable them to obtain special 
residence status in the host country.
n Protocol departments and Ministries of Interior 
should review and Governments should adapt, if 
needed, existing anti-trafficking regulations so as 
to enable domestic workers working for diplomats 
who are identified as presumed trafficked persons 
to benefit from the reflection period, short-term 
and long-term residence permits, including in 
cases where the diplomatic status of the employer 
does not allow for court proceedings.
5.5 Applicable Labor Law
In all six countries reviewed, national labor laws, 
including regulations establishing mandatory minimum 
wages, are in principle applicable to private domestic 
workers employed by diplomats. In practice, however, 
working conditions often differ substantially from 
these standards. In addition to the barriers to labor 
inspection and judicial recourse resulting from the 
employers’ diplomatic status, the hidden nature of 
domestic work in general makes it difficult for employ-
ees to prove breaches of labor law, in particular as 
regards payment of wages and working hours.
Model contracts provided by Protocol departments can 
help to ensure that the modalities governing employ-
ment relationships between diplomats and domestic 
workers are defined in line with national legal stand-
ards. It has emerged as good practice to make the use 
of such templates mandatory in the registration pro-
cess and to ensure that they are comprehensive and 
include, in particular, references to national minimum 
wages.
In countries like Switzerland, where labor law provi-
sions are regulated below the federal level, federal 
harmonization of basic labor standards such as mini-
mum wages is important in creating legal certainty for 
both, employees and employers, on their rights and 
obligations. In this regard, ongoing efforts by the Swiss 
government to adopt an Ordinance at the federal lev-
el regulating the working conditions of private domes-
tic workers employed by diplomats constitute a posi-
tive development.
The extent to which private domestic workers are cov-
ered by social security schemes differs from country to 
country. The most comprehensive approach among the 
six countries covered by this study can be found in 
Switzerland, where domestic workers are mandatorily 
covered by health, accident, invalidity and pension 
insurances.
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Recommendations:
n Protocol departments should ensure that private 
domestic workers employed by foreign diplomats 
are covered by national labor laws and/or any 
specific legislation in place covering domestic 
work.
n Protocol departments should ensure that adequate 
national minimum wages established by law or 
collective agreements apply to private domestic 
workers.
n Protocol departments should require written 
work contracts signed by both parties according 
to templates in line with national labor law 
and specifying key elements of the employment 
relationship, including salary, working hours 
and days off. Such templates should be made 
mandatory in the registration process. Contracts 
have to be written in a language the domestic 
worker understands.
n Governments should ensure that domestic work-
ers are covered by comprehensive social securi-
ty, including at a minimum health and accident 
insurance. This aim should be achieved either 
through requiring employers to provide proof of 
social security coverage and of payments of pre-
miums, or alternatively through including domes-
tic workers in the host countries’ social security 
schemes.
5.6 Diplomatic Measures
In addressing reported cases of rights violations, Pro-
tocol departments in host countries have a number of 
diplomatic measures at their disposal, covering a wide 
range from rather informal, lenient measures such as 
raising the matter with the diplomat’s embassy, delay-
ing or refusing the registration of future domestic 
workers or withdrawing unilateral tax privileges, to 
grave measures explicitly foreseen in the Vienna Con-
vention, such as requesting a waiver of the diplomat’s 
immunity or declaring her/him persona non grata.
In practice, measures tend to lean rather towards the 
lenient side of the spectrum, whereas more severe 
responses are considered measures of last resort and 
are hardly, if ever, applied in cases of exploitation of 
domestic workers.
Practices as regards requesting waivers of immunity 
differ substantially across the countries covered in the 
present study. The spectrum ranges from requesting 
waivers as standard practice in all cases presumably 
amounting to trafficking in human beings (United 
Kingdom) to a very restrictive approach where waivers 
are regarded appropriate in extreme cases only, such 
as murder (France).
The example of waivers illustrates that in enabling 
domestic workers to access justice not only host states 
but also sending states and international organizations 
have an important role to play, because it is within the 
power of the latter two to accept or refuse a waiver. 
Indeed, it has been commonly experienced across all 
countries covered that sending states basically never 
agreed to lift the immunity of their diplomats. Inter-
estingly, in some countries, international organizations 
have been found more open to lifting the immunity of 
their staff members.
In none of the countries have abusive diplomat employ-
ers ever been declared persona non grata. In general, 
this measure is very rarely applied, and if so, in case of 
serious criminal offences such as espionage or terror-
ism. Interestingly, the United Kingdom has also made 
use of persona non grata declarations in response to 
large patterns of illegal parking by diplomats, which 
proved effective as it led to a sharp drop in the num-
ber of parking tickets.
When it comes to the application of severe diplomat-
ic measures against abusive employers, domestic work-
ers often face a dilemma. On the one hand, such meas-
ures are desirable as they reflect the grave nature of 
the rights violations experienced and, once the obsta-
cle of diplomatic immunity has ceased to exist, enable 
domestic workers to seek legal redress against abusive 
employers – at least in theory. On the other hand, in 
practice, a common consequence of requests for waiv-
ers or threats to request the withdrawal of a diplomat 
is the latter’s prompt departure. This fact is not in the 
interest of the domestic workers, as it diminishes their 
chances of obtaining compensation and remuneration 
from their employers. Initiating legal proceedings in 
the diplomat’s sending country is a theoretical, but for 
various practical and legal reasons not very realistic 
option for domestic workers. Furthermore, it is not clear 
whether diplomats who committed rights violations 
abroad have to face any consequences of a legal or 
disciplinary nature on the part of their sending state 
or international organization. Therefore, the question 
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remains whether any diplomatic measures undertaken 
do in fact have a preventive or punitive effect, or rath-
er reinforce the message that in the end the diplomat 
does not face any legal consequences.
Recommendations:
n Protocol departments should make use of the 
entire range of diplomatic measures at their 
disposal, as appropriate, from lenient measures 
to far-reaching measures under the Vienna 
Convention, while ensuring that any measures 
taken reflect the nature and gravity of the rights 
violations in question. This should include, for 
host states, systematic requests for waivers of 
immunity and applying political pressure on 
sending states and international organizations 
to accept such requests; and for sending states 
and international organizations, accepting such 
requests. In cases of grave and/or repeated 
rights violations, Foreign Ministries should not 
shy away from declaring diplomats persona non 
grata, based on successful experiences with 
using this procedure to large patterns of illegal 
parking by diplomats in the United Kingdom. Any 
measures should be guided by the best interest 
of the domestic workers concerned, including in 
particular the realization of their labor law claims 
against their employers.
n Protocol departments should devise and apply 
criteria for the application of each diplomatic 
measure in response to rights violations of 
domestic workers. Among others, decisions which 
measure to apply should be guided by both the 
gravity of the criminal offence concerned (such 
as trafficking in human beings, rape, bodily injury, 
deprivation of liberty, etc.), as well as the degree 
of economic exploitation.
n When facilitating negotiations between private 
domestic workers and abusive diplomat employers, 
Protocol departments should, in case of prima 
facie evidence of rights violations, consider the 
application of diplomatic measures, where this is 
necessary to increase the diplomat’s willingness to 
agree to a fair settlement. The choice of measures 
should reflect the gravity of the rights violations 
involved.
n Authorities in host and sending countries 
should ensure that the application of diplomatic 
measures does not impede domestic workers’ 
access to justice. Following a host state’s request 
for a waiver, sending states should refrain from 
immediately withdrawing diplomats so that 
domestic workers can assert their claims for 
compensation and remuneration before the 
courts in the host country. In case the diplomat 
has left the host country, authorities in the latter 
should cooperate with their counterparts in the 
sending country or a third country, as appropriate, 
to enable domestic workers to seek redress from 
former employers, including the enforcement of 
any civil law judgments obtained. 
n Sending states should, where immunity does not 
allow for legal proceedings in the host country, 
exercise jurisdiction over their diplomats for 
rights violations committed abroad. 
5.7 Out-of-Court Negotiations between 
Domestic Workers and Diplomat 
Employers
Given the protection of diplomats under international 
law and the fact that diplomatic immunity from juris-
diction and execution is rarely waived by sending 
states, out-of-court negotiations provide in practice 
often the only and so far the most effective option for 
domestic workers to obtain compensation and remu-
neration from employers with diplomatic status.
At the same time, the informal setting of negotiations, 
while it can help to avoid some of the legal obstacles 
attached to the employer’s diplomatic status, also has 
some drawbacks: Employers are not obliged to par-
ticipate in negotiations. Furthermore, in most countries 
no formal platform exists for domestic workers to 
negotiate their claims. There are no guidelines in place 
to set the process of negotiations, and progress often 
depends on the commitment and attitudes of the indi-
viduals involved. 
As a rule, the final amounts negotiated are far below 
the workers’ legal entitlements. Mostly, state-funded 
legal aid is limited to legal proceedings and therefore 
not available for negotiations. Therefore the access to 
legal representation in practice often depends on funds 
raised by NGOs and on the availability of lawyers who 
work pro bono or for reduced fees. Another gap lies in 
the residence status of domestic workers following the 
end of the employment relationship: even in cases 
identified as presumed cases of human trafficking, spe-
cial residence permits are usually linked to legal pro-
ceedings, thus not applying to extra-judicial negotia-
tions. As in the case of legal proceedings, proving rights 
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violations occurred in domestic work, in particular 
unpaid wages and uncompensated overtime, is diffi-
cult. Another important factor which has not been 
addressed systematically is the power imbalance 
between the domestic worker on the one hand and the 
diplomat on the other hand. The participation of law-
yers, NGOs or trade unions besides or on behalf of the 
domestic worker can help to adjust this imbalance. 
As regards the involvement of Protocol departments 
in negotiations, the scope of their role as facilitator 
varies according to the perceptions of Foreign Ministry 
interviewees in the countries covered by the present 
study, ranging from no involvement in negotiations to 
a self-perception as mediator. The understanding of 
their roles is not formalized and seems to be influenced 
by factors such as the commitment of individual offi-
cials as well as by political and economic interests.
In some cases, actors involved as facilitators have 
seemed to play a rather strong role in setting terms for 
negotiations, through accepting or refusing the scope 
of claims negotiated or determining what is an appro-
priate amount for compensation. Such an approach 
tends to come closer to a court or arbitrating body, 
rather than a mediator.
In Switzerland, the Office of the Amiable Compositeur 
has been set up to facilitate employment-related dis-
putes between diplomats and their private employee 
– the only specialized body of its kind. Impartiality, 
independence and transparency are key attributes for 
an effective facilitator recognized by both sides, 
domestic workers and diplomats. The extent to which 
Foreign Ministries are able to fulfill this standard has 
been questioned, pointing to the Ministries’ role of 
maintaining well-functioning diplomatic relations with 
other states.
Recommendations:
n Governments should set up a mechanism for 
domestic workers to turn to with complaints of 
rights violations afflicted by diplomat employers. 
This mechanism should be tasked to facilitate the 
extra-judicial settlement of employment-related 
disputes, based on the principles of impartial-
ity, independence, transparency and acceptance 
by both parties. Procedural guidelines should be 
established laying down the steps of the proceed-
ings and the roles and responsibilities of the ac-
tors involved, as well as guidance for the calcula-
tion of claims. The procedure should ensure a bal-
ance of the unequal power relationship between 
domestic workers and diplomat employers, in 
particular through allowing domestic workers to 
be accompanied or represented by a lawyer, NGO 
or trade union representative in negotiations.
n For negotiations between domestic workers and 
diplomat employers facilitated by Protocol de-
partments, guidelines with the same require-
ments should be put into place.
n Domestic workers should have access to free legal 
advice and representation in negotiations. This 
could be achieved through governments providing 
state-funded legal aid, at least in cases involving 
severe rights violations. Where state-funded legal 
aid is not available, NGOs should approach law 
firms to further explore possibilities of pro bono 
legal representation as well as establish or deepen 
partnerships with trade unions, with a view to 
obtaining their support in representing domestic 
workers in negotiations.
5.8 Legal Proceedings against Diplomat 
Employers
Interview partners shared examples of legal proceed-
ings that have been instituted in their countries to hold 
diplomatic employers accountable for alleged rights 
violations. While the majority of known cases con-
cerned proceedings before labor courts or quasi-judi-
cial bodies, some cases had also been investigated and 
prosecuted by criminal justice authorities, often under 
the offence of human trafficking.
It has emerged from the interviews that legal proceed-
ings have so far had rather limited impact on the indi-
vidual rights of domestic workers, but have brought 
added value at the structural level. As a rule, legal 
cases are being closed at some point because of the 
procedural obstacle of diplomatic immunity. In some 
instances, proceedings were continued, sometimes 
resulting in judgments in favor of domestic workers. 
In only a few cases, this was possible following a waiv-
er of immunity of the employer – concerning mainly 
international civil servants, rather than diplomats sent 
by states. In other cases, immunity was not an obsta-
cle, for example because it had ceased to exist follow-
ing the diplomat’s retirement or departure or because 
the employer assumed to be a “diplomat” turned out 
not to possess diplomatic status, for instance because 
s/he was a lower rank staff members of an embassy or 
a family member of a diplomat who possessed the 
nationality of the host country. In some countries, labor 
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courts have issued judgments against diplomats based 
on an interpretation of diplomatic immunity which 
raises doubts as to their compatibility with the require-
ments of the Vienna Convention for issuing waivers, 
as was also pointed out by some interview partners. 
While these judgments might offer symbolic recogni-
tion to domestic workers of the injustice experienced, 
they fail to provide legal certainty. Interestingly, the 
recent judgment by the French Administrative Supreme 
Court97 presents an innovative alternative route for 
private domestic workers to obtain redress from the 
host state, where this is otherwise not possible under 
international diplomatic law. 
In those few cases where a court judgment could be 
obtained, the departure of diplomats and immunity 
from execution have been major obstacles for domes-
tic workers seeking to enforce their legal rights. Indeed, 
there is little evidence of domestic workers who have 
actually received payments from their employers as a 
result of legal proceedings. Unless sending states also 
waive diplomats’ immunity from execution, court judg-
ments may on the paper provide satisfaction to domes-
tic workers, but fail to offer them a realistic chance to 
enforce their legal entitlements.
A major problem for domestic workers when seeking 
legal recourse is the lack of evidence, in particular for 
unpaid wages and uncompensated overtime. This fact 
reflects the general difficulty of proving rights viola-
tions that took place in the private sphere of the home, 
hidden away from the public and often without wit-
nesses.
In criminal proceedings, the familiarity of criminal jus-
tice authorities with existing procedures on how to 
deal with cases presumably involving diplomatic immu-
nity and their capacities to approach forced labor tak-
ing place in private homes as a matter of criminal law 
are key prerequisites to enable private domestic work-
ers to access justice. While some improvements in this 
field have been noted by interview partners, it became 
apparent that more needs to be done to ensure appro-
priate responses. In particular, the question how far 
police and prosecutors may go in investigating and 
prosecuting cases against diplomats without trans-
gressing the boundaries of international diplomatic 
law has in some countries emerged as a grey area 
requiring clarification – for criminal justice authorities 
as well as some interview partners.
Recommendations:
n Foreign Ministries, Ministries of the Interior and 
Ministries of Justice should sensitize and inform 
police, prosecutors and judges on the scope of 
diplomatic immunity and its implications for legal 
proceedings as well as on existing procedures 
to confirm the immunity status of a presumed 
diplomat and to request waivers of immunity. 
This should also include the preparation of 
guidelines laying down the powers of police and 
prosecutors to investigate and prosecute alleged 
breaches of criminal law within the boundaries 
of international diplomatic law, also with a view 
to enable domestic workers to benefit from 
reflection periods and a residence permit for 
trafficked persons.
n Foreign Ministries, Ministries of the Interior and 
Ministries of Justice should sensitize criminal 
justice authorities on rights violations involved 
in the context of forced labor in domestic work 
in order to ensure that these are understood and 
treated as matters of criminal law.
n Protocol departments, criminal justice actors and 
NGOs should improve information sharing on 
legal proceedings against diplomat employers. 
n Domestic workers should have access to free legal 
advice and representation in legal proceedings. 
That could be achieved through governments 
providing state-funded legal aid, at least in cases 
involving severe rights violations. Where state-
funded legal aid is not available, NGOs should 
approach law firms to further explore possibilities 
of pro bono legal representation as well as 
establish or deepen partnerships with trade 
unions, with a view to obtaining their support in 
representing domestic workers in proceedings.
5.9 Strategic Litigation
Strategic litigation before national and international 
courts as well as regional and international human 
rights bodies can offer advocates for domestic work-
ers’ rights a useful tool for challenging traditional legal 
concepts around the compatibility of international dip-
lomatic law with international human rights law, in 
particular regarding the right of access to justice.
97  See chapter 4.4.2.1.
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Recommendations:
n Lawyers and NGOs should prepare test cases on 
behalf of private domestic workers before the 
European Court for Human Rights, challenging 
diplomatic immunity and its compatibility with 
human rights. Possible entry points for the 
argumentation include recent developments in 
international law to reduce the scope of state 
immunity for civil proceedings, as well as the 
international legal principles of the forfeiture 
of immunity in cases of severe human rights 
violations and the assumption of compatibility 
between the fields of international diplomatic law 
and international human rights law. Lawyers and 
NGOs who have prepared legal argumentations 
should share them with counterparts in other 
European countries. NGOs should raise funds 
so that potential plaintiffs can afford to decline 
insufficient offers in out-of-court negotiations 
and are encouraged to engage in strategic 
litigation cases .
n Lawyers and NGOs should bring test cases to 
national courts of last instance and the European 
Court of Human Rights to address gaps in 
the investigation and prosecution of cases of 
trafficking for forced labor in domestic work.
n Lawyers and NGOs should explore the potential 
of bringing claims on behalf of private domestic 
workers under the doctrine of state liability, based 
on the argumentation of the French Supreme 
Administrative Court in its recent judgment of 
February 2011.98
n Lawyers and NGOs should bring complaints against 
host states on behalf of private domestic workers 
or initiate inquiries before UN human rights treaty 
bodies, for example under the Convention on the 
Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW)99 or the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)100 to challenge 
cases where domestic workers have become 
victims of trafficking and/or have been unable 
to access justice against diplomat employers at 
the national level. Past experiences with these 
procedures, for example an NGO’s efforts in 2003 
to initiate an inquiry procedure before the CEDAW 
Committee to address exploitation and abuse of 
private domestic workers by diplomat employers, 
should be evaluated and shared so as to allow for 
lessons learned to be taken up and adapted to 
other countries’ contexts.
n Lawyers and NGOs should engage in mutual 
exchange and information sharing at the European 
level on experiences with strategic litigation, for 
example through translating and circulating key 
national Supreme Court judgments or important 
legislative developments.
5.10 Promoting the Issue on the Inter-
national Agenda
The issue of rights violations experienced by domestic 
workers employed by diplomats and the gaps and chal-
lenges these workers face in accessing justice as a 
result from diplomatic immunity, has increasingly 
emerged on the international agenda over the past 
decade. The increasing recognition of the issue as a 
matter of concern by governments, NGOs and region-
al and international organizations provides a strategic 
opportunity to keep the momentum and to further push 
for developments strengthening the access to justice 
for private domestic workers.
Recommendations:
n NGOs should continue to provide information 
on the situation of migrant domestic workers 
employed by foreign diplomats in their 
respective country to international human rights 
mechanisms, including in parallel reporting to UN 
treaty bodies established under instruments such 
as CEDAW, the Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(MWC) as well as in information notes and urgent 
appeals to UN special procedures, including the 
Special Rapporteurs on Trafficking in Persons, on 
the Human Rights of Migrants, Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery, Violence against Women and on 
Torture.
98  Conseil d´Etat N°325253. 
99  For example based on Article 6 or Article 11 of CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation no. 26 on Women 
Migrant Workers (see chapter 1.2.).
100  For example based on Article 8 and Article 2 paragraph 3 b of the ICCPR.
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n NGOs should provide inputs to the evaluation 
procedure by the Group of Experts on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) 
under the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings, in particular 
under Article 15 (access to compensation and 
legal redress).
n Foreign Ministries should put the issue of 
exploitation of domestic workers by diplomat 
employers high on the agenda of the regular 
meetings of Heads of Protocol departments from 
EU Member States.
n A permanent working group should be set up at UN 
level, with balanced geographical representation. 
This group should serve as a forum for exchange 
among governments on best practices as well as 
on gaps in enabling domestic workers to access 
justice against diplomat employers, and come 
up with proposals to address these gaps. More 
specifically, possible tasks of the working group 
include the elaboration of guidelines and codes 
of conduct for UN Member States to improve the 
access of private domestic workers employed by 
diplomats to redress. The working group should 
closely consult with relevant NGOs.
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Private Domestic Workers.
Germany: Federal Foreign Office, Protocol - Unit Dip-
lomatic Missions and Consular Posts, International 
Organizations: Personnel Status Issues, Visas, Protocol 
ID Cards.
Switzerland: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Directorate for Public International Law – Unit for Dip-
lomatic and Consular Law: Caroline Kraege, Deputy 
Head of Unit.
United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
Protocol - Diplomatic Missions and International 
Organizations Unit: Barry Nicholas, Head of Unit.
Office of the Amiable Compositeur
Office of the Amiable Compositeur, Geneva, Switzer-
land: Martine Brunschwig Graf, President.
Non-Governmental Organizations
Au Cœur des Grottes, Geneva, Switzerland: Anne Marie 
Von Arx Vernon, Psychologist.
Ban Ying, Berlin, Germany: Nivedita Prasad, Project 
Coordinator.
Bonded Labour in the Netherlands (BLinN), Amsterdam, 
The Netherlands: Eline Willemsen, Project Manager.
Comité Contre l´Esclavage Moderne (CCEM), Paris, 
France: Bénédicte Bourgeois, Head of Legal Service and 
Advocacy.
Fachstelle Frauenhandel und Frauenmigration (FIZ), 
Zurich, Switzerland: Susanne Seytter, Staff member 
Advocacy, Public Relations and Finances.
Geneva Forum of Philippine Concerns, Geneva, Swit-
zerland: Joseph Sycip, President.
Kalayaan, London, United Kingdom: Jenny Moss, Com-
munity Advocate.
LEFÖ Intervention Center for Trafficked Women, Vien-
na, Austria: Evelyn Probst, Coordinator.
Migrant Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI), Dublin, Ireland: 
Aoife Smith, Coordinator of the Domestic Workers 
Action Group.
Organisatie voor Clandestiene Arbeidsmigranten 
(OR.C.A), Brussels, Belgium: Elke Gutiérrez, Domestic 
Workers Project Officer.
Pag-Asa, Brussels, Belgium: Sally Beeckman, Head of 
Legal Unit.
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Annex: List of Interview Partners 
Lawyers
Nicolas Angelet, Law firm Liedekerke, Wolters, Wael-
brock, Kirkpatrick, Brussels, Belgium.
Jean Pierre Garbade, Law firm Jean Pierre Garbade, 
Geneva, Switzerland.
Emily Gibbs, Kensington Law Centre, London, United 
Kingdom.
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